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I. INTRODUCTION
In May and July 1994, local landowners near and downriver from the Ok
Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea filed lawsuits in the Supreme Court of Victoria
(Australia) against Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (B-P), the
majority owner of the mine, and against Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML), the
corporation operating the mine.' The suit, in which plaintiffs' lawyers claim that
compensatory and exemplary damages could amount to four billion Australian
dollars,2 is the largest compensatory action in Australian history? This dispute
exemplifies the problems which may arise between indigenous populations and
the owners of major natural resource exploitation projects in developing
countries. This article argues that the involvement of local communities in the
negotiation of the Ok Tedi mining agreement might have avoided this dispute,
and argues more generally that local communities in developing countries should
be involved in the negotiation of mining agreements. It goes on to recommend a
process for involving these communities in the negotiations of the agreements.
I. See, e.g., Statement of Claim, Barry John Shackles and Daru Fish Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. BHP
Minerals Pty. Ltd. and Ok Tedi Mining Ltd., No. 5980 of 1994 [hereinafter Shackles Statement of Claim];
Statement of Claim. Alex Maun and Others v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd. and Ok Tedi Mining
Ltd., No. 6862 of 1994 [hereinafter Maun Statement of Claim].
2. Rod Myer, Ok TediBattle Builds Behind the Scenes, SUNDAY AGE (Melbourne), June 19, 1994, at
19.
3. Michael Gill, BHPAdmits Dumping Ok Tedi Mine Waste, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., June 17, 1994,
at 33.
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This article will explore the importance of including local communities in the
negotiation of mining agreements in developing countries, using the Ok Tedi case
as an example. Part II will discuss the political and economic position of Papua
New Guinea; Part I will discuss the negotiation of and the effects of the Ok Tedi
project. Part IV will evaluate the Ok Tedi agreement and discuss how it might
have been different had local communities been involved in the negotiation pro-
cess from the start. Parts V through VII will explore three categories of reasons
for the involvement of local communities in the negotiation of mining contracts,
using concrete examples from the Ok Tedi experience and from other mineral
extraction projects in Papua New Guiruea: Part V will discuss emerging norms of
international law that give indigenous populations the right to control the environ-
ments in which they live; Part VI will discuss practical reasons for including local
communities in the negotiation of mining agreements; and Part VII will give
moral justifications for including local communities in the negotiation process.
With the importance of involving local communities in the negotiation of a
mining agreement having been made clear, Part VIII will present some of the
problems that national governments and transnational corporations will confront
when involving local communities in the negotiation process, and will discuss
potential solutions to these problems. Part IX will then describe the negotiation
process that the author believes best addresses the needs of transnational cor-
porations, host country governments, and local communities.
I1. PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Papua New Guinea (PNG) shares the large, mountainous, mineral-rich island
of New Guinea, north of Australia, with the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya. A
former territory of Australia, PNG became independent in 1975 and has been
governed since then by a popularly elected parliament. Eighty-five percent of the
population lives in rural areas, where villagers still rely on traditional law rather
than the Western system that was established in 1975.! Historically, indigenous
groups have been separated from each other by the rugged terrain, resulting in
numerous unique tribes with separate languages.5 Anthropologist Frederik Barth
has written that until very recently, a man in the Star Mountains, where Ok Tedi
is located, could look across the forest and see smoke rising thirty miles away and
know that no person he had ever met had visited such a place, or any place
4. Geoffrey Maslen, A New World Order, GoODWEEar D MmAUSTRAIAN), Dec. 10, 1994. at 18,
24; GRAsmD ORRANCE, THEPAPUANEW GUINF.A ECONOMY 42 (Islands/Australia Working Paper No. 89/4,
1989).
5. Estimates of the number of languages spoken in PNG range from 700 to 869. See, e.g., George B.
BALDWIN, ErAL., PAPUA NEw GUINEA: ITS ECONOMIC SIUATION AND PROSPECrS FOR DEVELOPMENT (World
Bank Country Economic Report, 1978); Cameron Forbes, Social Database Goes Back to Basics, Mm
AusTRALIAN. Sept. 16, 1994, at 10.
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beyond it.6 Some locals in the Western/Fly River Province, where the Ok Tedi
Mine is located, first had contact with Europeans as recently as the 1960s7
A. Papua New Guinea's Lack of Development
The level of development in PNG, particularly in rural areas, remains low
despite the country's mineral wealth. In 1994, gross domestic product per capita
totaled US$1278.8 Up to seventy percent of Papua New Guineans are illiterate!
Only twenty percent of students go past the sixth grade, only three percent
complete the tenth grade, 0 and fewer than one percent go on to the university
level." Health services are inadequate in rural areas, and infant mortality rates are
very high.12 Life expectancy is five years below the average for middle-income
countries.13 Per capita grants to local government are used for projects such as
feeder roads, water systems, toilets, and classrooms.
14
The national government has recently had to deal with economic instability
in PNG. In early September 1994, it devalued the kina (PNG currency) twelve
percent and froze public sector wages;15 over a three month span, the kina was
ultimately devalued thirty percent. 16 Serious underlying structural imbalances in
the economy include large, persistent fiscal deficits, high unemployment, a lack
of growth in sectors of the economy other than mining, an exchange rate regime
that prevents competitiveness, and a lack of physical and social infrastructure.
7
In 1994, schools closed two months early for Christmas because the government
could not afford to complete the school year, 18 and more than AUS$100 million
in government bills remain unpaid. 9
6. R.JAcKSONOKTEDI:THEPOTOF GOLD 17(1982).
7. Myer, supra note 2, at 19.
8. Pacific Island IMF Member Countries: Basic Data, 24 IMF SuRv y 32 (1995). While this per
capita GDP is far from the lowest of Pacific Island Member countries (Kiribati has an annual per capita GDP
of USS500 and the Soloman Islands have an annual per capita GDP of US$679), it is also well below the
annual per capita GDPs of Micronesia (US$1,900) and Fiji (US$I,884). Id.
9. Maslen, supra note 4, at 24.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. PNG's Drift Towards Disaster, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., June 8, 1994, at 18.
13. Id.
14. Forbes, supra note 5, at 10.
I5. Robin Bromby, Devaluation Underlines Fragile Economy, THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 16, 1994, at
9.
16. Rowan Callick, PNG's Year of Living Dangerously, AUSTRALLAN FiN. REv., Dec. 30, 1994, at 9.
17. Bromby, supra note 15, at 9.
18. Callick, supra note 16, at 9.
19. Id.
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Encouraging development is particularly important to the government of
PNG because, as elected representatives in a democratic society,2 members of
parliament face a constant threat of being voted out of office; therefore, they have
strong incentives to satisfy the demands of their electorates. This threat is parti-
cularly strong in PNG, where sixty percent of the members of parliament lost
their seats in the 1992 national election.2
B. Papua New Guinea's Dependence on the Mining Sector as a Source of
Funds for Development
Papua New Guinea is dependent upon the minerals industry for future
development. Copper comprised sixty-two percent of the value of total exports
from PNG in the early 1990s.22 It was large increases in mining production that
enabled PNG to achieve high rates of economic growth from 1991 to 1993.23 The
government of PNG has long relied on enclave mining projects as a major source
of funds for general development. In 1977, the PNG Department of Finance
stated that, "Papua New Guinea's mineral policy is premised on the view that
large mines are useful not for any direct benefits they bring, but for the financial
support that they can provide for progress towards other national goals."2 4 In
September 1994, the newly elected Chan government announced that approval
of the AUS$900 Lihir gold mine project was one of its top priorities. 25 This indi-
cates that even under a new government, there is still tremendous interest in the
benefits created by large enclave mining projects.
III. THE OK TEDi MnE
The Ok Tedi Mine is owned fifty-two percent by BHP, eighteen percent by
Toronto-based Metall Mining Corporation, and thirty percent by the national
government of PNG.26 The mine is located on Mount Fubilan, in the Western/Fly
20. In the 1992 national election, seventy percent of the population voted. Rowan Callick, A Wave of
Optimism with the New PM-Papua New Guinea, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Sept. 16, 1994, at 39S. Voting is
noncompulsory in PNG. Id.
21. Id.
22. JoHN YourNG, MININGTnEEARTTH 32 (World Watch Paper 109, July 1992) (citing IlfrERNATiONAL
MONErARYFiND, INTERNATIONAL FNAN1cAL STAmsrcs, May 1992).
23. Bromby, supra note 15, at 9 (citing ASiANDEvELopMENTBANK 1994 OtUTLOOKREPORT).
24. M.M. Taylor, A Review of Foreign Investment Policy in Papua New Guinea: The First Decade
(1986) (unpublished thesis, Harvard Law School) (citing PAPUA NEW GUINEA DEPARiTMEr OF FTNANCE,
FNANc4AL POLICIS RELATNGTOamNG TAX LGSLAT'ON: STATEMENTOFImTEr (Walgani, October 1977)
(copy on file with the author)). See also BALDWIN, supra note 5, at 7.
25. Finola Goodward, Policy Change a Positive Liftfor Resources, THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 16, 1994,
at 12.
26. Court Backs Tribes, FIN. POST, June 17,1994, § 1, at 43; BROKEN HILLPROPRIrARY COMPANY
LTD., DIRECoN UPDATE REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERs, JUNE 1994 1 (1994)(on file with author).
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River Province of PNG, on the Ok Tedi River, which is a tributary of the Fly
River. The Ok Tedi/Fly River system runs for over 700 miles and is one of the
largest in the world. Gold was extracted from the cap from 1984 to 1986; both
gold and copper were extracted from the base from 1986 to 1988; and since 1988,
only copper has been extracted 7 The extraction of copper is expected to continue
until 20080:
A. Benefits Provided to the People of Papua New Guinea and the
WesternFly River Province by the Ok Tedi Mine
There is no doubt that the Ok Tedi Mine has contributed much to the people
of the Western/Fly River Province and to PNG as a whole. The mine has created
nearly 5000 jobs, with 1850 direct employees, of whom eighty-eight percent are
Papua New Guineans.9 Medical and health services have been provided to
10,000 villagers in the vicinity of the mine, reducing infant mortality from
thirty-three percent to three percent, and increasing the average life span in the
region from thirty years to more than fifty years.30 To the end of 1993, OTML
had spent more than 300 million kina on infrastructure that will remain after mine
closure?' Local landowners receive royalties and lease payments from the
project, 2 with each receiving AUS$4,000 per year 3 By the end of 1993, OTML
had contributed 10.865 million kina to the Lower Ok Tedi/Fly River Develop-
ment Trust. The Trust is operated, in conjunction with the national and provincial
governments as well as village representatives, to identify and develop com-
mercial ventures and to provide facilities and amenities to those villages along the
Lower Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers that are outside the mine lease area and do not
receive direct royalty or land lease payments. 4 Projects have included con-
struction of more than three hundred water tanks to provide clean water to
villagers, 35 improvement of local roads, 36 the construction of twenty classrooms,37
provision of equipment to encourage commercial fishing businesses in the Middle
27. HELEN ROSENBAUM & MICHAEL KROCKENBERGER, AUSTRALIAN CONSERVATION FOUNDATION,
REPORT ONTHE IMPACTS OFTHE OKTEDIMNE INPAPUA NEW GUINEA 5 (1993).
28. Id.
29. BROKEN HIILPROPRIETARY COMPANY LTD., supra note 26, at 2.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. For discussion of the payments to local landowners, see infra notes 186-192 and accompanying text.
33. Myer, supra note 2. a 19.
34. LOwER OKTEI/FLYRIVER DEELOPmENTTRuTM. 1993 ANNUALREPORT 1 (1993)(on file with
author).
35. Id. at 5. Critics of the Ok Tedi Mine point out that before the mine was developed, villagers had
a reliable source of water in the very rivers that the mine has polluted. ROSENBAUM & KROCKENBERGER, supra
note 27, at 19.
36. LOwER OK TEDIFLY RIV EL DEVELOPmENTTRUST, supra note 34, at 6.
37. Id.
309
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Fly area,38 and the provision of support for the development of a rubber pro-
cessing factory in Kiunga. 9 A vegetable growing project that provides food to
mine workers has also been successful.40
Papua New Guinea as a whole benefits from the Ok Tedi Mine through
royalties, dividends, and tax payments to the National Government.4 Projections
for 1991 predicted that the Ok Tedi Mine would contribute 27.4 million kina to
the PNG government's revenue, 3.3% of the year's total internal revenue
2
Additionally, in 1993, OTML contributed 76.2 million kina indirectly to the
national economy by purchasing fifty-eight percent of OTML's supplies from
PNG sources.43 In 1993, the Ok Tedi Mine provided sixteen percent of PNG's
total merchandise export earnings.44 The government of PNG has been described
as "desperate to maximize its Ok Tedi revenue to compensate for the closure of
Bougainville, the decline of Kutubu oil production, and the endless delays in
developing Lihir and the South-East Gobe oilfield."' s
B. Environmental Damage Caused by the Ok Tedi Mine
1. The Use of Cyanide in Gold Mining at Ok Tedi Prior to 1988
Prior to 1988, OTML used cyanide in the processing of gold extracted from
the mine. 6 During the construction of the project, the PNG government was
uncertain whether cyanide would be diffused by oxygenation in a tailings pond
as proposed by OTML; therefore, it required the construction of a cyanide
destruction tower and careful monitoring of cyanide levels in the tailings pond.47
While there have been a few accidents involving cyanide,48 there are no indi-
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. at 10.
40. MICHAELC. HOWARD. TEl PAC"OFTHE INTERNATIONALMINING INDUSTRY ON NATIVE PEOPLES
105 (Transnational Corporations Research Project, Department of Geography, University of Sydney, 1988).
41. For discussion of the payments to the government, see infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
42. CENTREFORINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, REPORT ON THE OK TEDI MINE 1 (1991) (on file with
author).
43. BROKEN HI.L PROPRIETARY COMPANY LTD., supra note 26, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Mark Davis, Mining-PNG Presses for Ok Tedi Tailings Dam, Bus. REv. WKLY., May 16, 1994,
at 28.
46. Marie-Louise O'Callaghan, Ok Tedi Claim Facing BHP Adds to PNG Litany of Woes, THE AGE
(Melbourne), May 9,1994. at 32.
47. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 113.
48. In June 1984, a barge overturned in the Fly River estuary, releasing 2700 sixty liter drums of
cyanide. David Hyndman, Melanesian Resistance to Ecocide and Ethnocide: Transnational Mining Projects
and the Fourth World on the Island of New Guinea, in TRIBAL PEOPLES & DEvEOPMENT ISSUES 281,290
(John H. Bodley ea., 1988). Following this spill, there were unconfirmed reports of villagers dying after eating
contaminated crocodile meat, and villagers threatened to blockade the mine unless they received compensation.
Bow andArrow Threat Over Cyanide Spill in Papua New Guinea, RErTERS N. EUR. SERVIcE, July 26, 1984,
available in LEXS, News Library, Arcnws File. A second spill of cyanide drums occurred in the Gulf of
310
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cations of enduring environmental damage from its use. This is probably because
cyanide is quickly converted to nontoxic forms in the environment and in at least
some animals 9 Environmental damage caused by cyanide is not mentioned in the
Australian Conservation Foundation Report on the Ok Tedi Mine ° nor in the
lawsuits filed against BHP by landowners in the vicinity of or downstream from
the mine.1
2. Inputs of Natural Materials into the Ok Tedi/Fly River System
Each day, OTML processes 80,000 tons of ore from which copper is con-
centrated and piped to a port for international shipment.52 After the copper is
removed from the ore, the tailings are dumped without treatment into the Ok
Mani River, which feeds into the Ok Tei. 3 These tailings still contain fifteen
percent of their original copper content, as well as the heavy metals zinc,
cadmium, and lead.:-4 These tailings are joined in the river system by eroding
materials from the dumps where OTML piles waste rock from the mine."5 Several
international environmental groups have condemned the environmental damage
caused by the Ok Tedi Mine 6
The introduction of these materials into the waters of the Ok Tedi and Fly
Rivers has caused serious environmental damage to the river system and to the
surrounding land. The bed of the Ok Tedi has risen by five meters, and by over
ten meters in its upper reaches, drowning traditional gardens and approximately
eight square kilometers of forest. 7 This flooding was anticipated during the
development of the mineO8 Landowners downstream along the Middle Fly and
the Ok Tedi claim that the rivers have become shallower and therefore faster and
Papua on their way to the mine in May 1985. HOWARD, supra note 40, at 105. Additionally, there was an
accidental flow of cyanide into the river from the mine in mid-1984, when abypass valve left open at the mine
released 1000 cubic liters of highly concentrated cyanide waste into the Ok Tedi. Hyndman at 290. Crocodiles
and turtles were killed in this cyanide spill, alerting authorities to the escape of cyanide from the mine. The
government closed the mine until a government inspection was completed. Crocodiles Close Ok Tedi, MINING
MAoAZINE, Aug., 1984, at 90. See also Philip Hughes & Mijorie Sullivan, Environmental Impact Assessment
in Papua New Guinea: Lessonsfor the Wider Pacific Region, 30 PAC. VIEWpOImT 34, 39 (1989).
49. Humans can quickly recover from nonlethal doses of cyanide because the cyanide is converted by
the human body to a nontoxic substance. Cyanide, 3 MI.cROPEDsA BtrrrANicA 817 (15th ed. 1992).
50. See ROSENBAUM & KROCKEaEEmsR supra note 27.
51. See Shackles Statement of Claim, supra note 1; Maun Statement of Claim, supra note 1.




56. In Febrary, 1992, the International Water Tribunal, a watchdog organization founded by European
Governments, concluded that OTM. should phase out operations unless it stores and treats wastes. Id. at 9.
See generally, id.
57. RosENBAuM & KROCKENBERGEr. supra note 27, at 9. The effects of the mine on local landowners
will be discussed in Part 1I.C, infra.
58. JACKsON, supra note 6, at 118.
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more dangerous 9 It is estimated that the mine's inputs into the river system will
increase suspended sediment levels by more than 1000 percent during peak
production.60
The impact of these inputs on marine life in the Ok Tedi/Fly River System
is significant. The first seventy kilometers of the Ok Tedi are almost biologically
dead, and the species diversity in the next 130 kilometers has been dramatically
reduced.6' Even in the Fly River immediately below the Ok Tedi junction, there
has been a significant reduction in fish biomass and a change in species com-
position. 62 Landowners along the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers have expressed concern
about the reduction in the number of fish and crocodiles.63 Additionally, the fish
catch at Kuambit, which lies five kilometers downstream from the confluence of
the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers, has declined by approximately forty percent between
1983 and 1992.64
OTML claims that the rivers will return to normal within twenty years after
production at the mine ceases.65 Even if this is true, however, it has been stated
that the ecology of the river system (and the lifestyles of those dependent upon
it) will be disrupted for at least fifty years.6 OTML also claims that because
landslides are frequent in the area near the mine, the aquatic ecosystems of the
river system are adapted to high levels of sediment and can adapt to the mine's
inputs.'7 Environmental experts, however, dispute this claim because "while
sediment levels may remain high for weeks or months following a natural event
they will remain relentlessly elevated for the life of the mine."6 8
Presumably, much of this environmental damage could have been avoided by
a tailings dam at the site where tailings are dumped into the river system. A
tailings dam would allow tailings to enter the river system at a more gradual rate
by limiting the daily input; this would minimize the environmental impact of the
tailings. OTML was building such a tailings dam in 1984, but construction was
abandoned after an earthquake-induced landslide destroyed the dam under
construction.69 In 1989, the PNG government formally approved continued oper-
ations without a tailings dam even though it had been reported to the cabinet that
increased sedimentation could result in "fish losses.., as little as nothing or as
59. Shackles Statement of Claim, supra note 1. at 5; Maun Statement of Claim, supra note 1, at 7.
60. ROSENBAUm & KROCKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 8.
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id. at 10.
65. ROsENBAUM & KROCKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 9.
66. rd.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Il
69. Id. at 6.
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high as everything."70 At the time the decision was made to allow continued
operations without a tailings dam, at least one member of parliament, Parry Zeipi,
sought a court order to close the mine until further study of the issue could be
completed!' It was decided that it was impractical to build a new tailings dam
because of the expense involved,2 and because of the heavy rainfall and the fre-
quency of earthquakes in the area?3 A tailings dam that was at risk of collapse
could be more environmentally damaging than depositing tailings directly into the
river system. A dam's failure could result in the deposit of a tremendous amount
of tailings into the river system at once, rather than a more gradual deposit 74
In addition, environmental groups have described the monitoring system
established by OTML as inadequate. The Australian Conservation Foundation's
Report on the Impacts of the Ok Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea stated that:
[The] narrow range of compliance parameters [agreed upon by the PNG
government and OTML] are insufficient to ensure that the ecological
viability of the river system is maintained. Furthermore, there appears to
be little scientific basis for the standards, as they were developed to
facilitate the realization of OTML's mining schedule, rather than to
protect the environment. 5
This makes the fact that OTML has, for the most part, complied with the
parameters7 6 seem less significant.
C. Cultural Damage Caused by the Ok Tedi Mine
The environmental damage and other disruptions created by the Ok Tedi
Mine have had a profound impact on the lives and cultures of indigenous popu-
lations in the vicinity of and downstream from the mine. The people of the region
surrounding the mine have, or had at least into the early 1970s, an almost
complete dependence on the environment of the territory they owned and con-
trolled for all their needs-both spiritual and material.7 Prior to the development
70. Davis, supra note 45, at 28. At least one commentator indicates that a AUSS2.5 million annual grant
to benefit the people downstream from the mine was obtained from OTML as compensation for the effects that
the increased sedimentation of the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers would have on them. MiCHAEL C. HOWARD,
MINING, PoLrfmcs, AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOuf PACIFIC 65 (1991).
71. HOWARD, supra note 70, at 65.
72. OTML estimated the cost of building a tailings dam to be approximately US$380 million,
threatening the mine's financial future. HOWARD, supra note 70, at 65.
73. Rowan Callick, PNG Discusses Options for Ok Tedi Tailings, AUSrRALLAN FIN. REV., May 24.
1994 at 25.
74. Davis, supra note 45, at 28.
75. ROSENBAuM & KROCKENBERGER, supra note 27, at II.
76. Davis, supra note 45, at 28.
77. JACKSON, supra note 6. at 103.
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of the mine, streams surrounding the Ok Tedi/Fly River system carried over forty
species of fish and several types of crustaceans, turtles, and crocodiles, all of
which form an important part of the diet of the Ningerum (one of the cultural
groups affected by the establishment of the Ok Tedi Mine)? s
The indigenous population affected by the mine is comprised of four cultural
groups: 5000 Min in the Star Mountains; 10,000 Awin near Kiunga; and Yongom
and Ningerum between Kiunga and the Star Mountains. 9 Prior to the develop-
ment of Ok Tedi, population density in the region was low, and eighty-five
percent of the indigenous population lived in small trading villages of less than
250 people.80
1. Culture Groups at the Mine and Tabubil
Most of the land on which the Ok Tedi Mine has been established is owned
by the Wopkaimin, a subgroup of the Min cultural group, while much of the land
where the tailings dam was initially intended to be constructed belongs to the
Ningerum.81 The traditional food sources of these groups have been affected by
the Ok Tedi Mine. Prior to the development of the mine, it was predicted that the
growth of the township at Tabubil would result in the loss of some gardens for
Min groups, and that the development of the mine itself, with the accompanying
roads and processing plants, would result in a considerable loss of hunting land
for other groups.82 Additionally, birds and fish are an important protein source for
local communities8 3 Fish play a particularly important role in the diets of women
and children due to cultural taboos.4 It was predicted that because most of the
Min fishing was in tributary creeks rather than in main rivers, their fish supply
would be less dramatically affected by the mine.85 Nevertheless, the reduction in
the number and variety of fish in major rivers reported by environmental groups
surely affects the fish stock of small creeks as well. It was also predicted that the
few sago palms which grow at the bottom of some valleys in the Mins' territory
would be destroyed by flooding.8 6 These palms are not an important food source
for the Min, but are eaten when the taro harvest is reduced and are also used as
roofing material.87 It was predicted during the mine's development that the loss
78. Id. at 19.
79. WILLIAM S. Puirz, OKTEDI: EVOLUTION OF A THIRD WORLD MINING PROJECT 23 (1984).
80. Id.
81. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 18-19.
82. Id. at 119.
83. PINTZ, supra note 79, at 21.
84. IL at 23.
85. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 119.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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of these palms would be particularly harmful to indigenous women, who used
trips to the sago stands as a rare opportunity to hunt small wildlife. g
Equally important are the effects the mine has had on the spiritual life of the
Min. One individual involved in the development of the Ok Tedi Mine wrote that,
"Everything the Min understand of the world is tied up in their environment.
Environment is the basis of his beliefs, and his religion--every site is sacred in
this sense." 9 The Wopkaimin traditionally revered Mt. Fubilan as a sacred site
towering above the "land of the dead."' Certainly the destruction of the mountain
caused by the mine-the reduction in height of several hundred meters and the
creation of a crater that is hundreds of meters deep9P-will have a profound
psychological effect on the Wopkaimin.
Dramatic lifestyle changes have also negatively affected the people of the
Star Mountains. The suddei introduction of alcohol, a cash economy, formal
education, and consumer goods have changed the lifestyles of communities such
as those of the Min and the Ningerum, who are directly affected by the mine.92
While half the Wopkaimin men were employed during the construction of the
mine, after the construction was completed, Ok Tedi became known as the "place
without work." 93 Wopkaimin began expanding former sago groves into roadside
villages as Wopkaimin were compelled to leave Tabubil. 4 These villages are
large by Wopkaimin standards-over 350 residents-and residents do not interact
as a socially viable community!-' One critic of the mine writes that, "excessive
drunken behaviour, black-marketing of beer, and fighting and adultery associated
with heavy drinking threaten family life."
'
Additionally, there is grave concern that even for those local residents who
are currently benefitting financially from the mine (either through lease and
royalty payments or through employment at the minelor in Tabubil), the benefits
will be short-lived. Thus, the mine will have irrevocably taken away these
peoples' lifestyles and replaced them with something that is not sustainable in the
long-term. For example, businesses in Tabubil provide goods and services almost
solely to the mine; these businesses may not survive past the mine's closure
because of this dependence on the mine and because of the remoteness of the
town.97
88. Id.
89. Id. at 28 (empbasis in original).
90. ROSENBAUM & KROCKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 7.
91. Id.; JACKSON, supra note 6, at I11.
92. ROSENBAuM & KROcKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 18.
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2. Culture Groups Downstream from the Mine
The Awin, who live downriver from the mine, have traditionally been sago
gatherers.98 These people had already undergone a dramatic change in lifestyle
without government encouragement or assistance by developing a rubber industry
and building a road from Kiunga to Rumginae to assist in the industry's growth.99
This experiment has had mixed results, even though it was predicted at the time
the mine was being developed that the mine would give new life to the roadside
Awin villages.' 1In spite of the adaptability of these downstream residents, how-
ever, the mine has had a negative impact on their lifestyles. The increased amount
of sediment in the river water has made it undrinkable, or at least less desirable
to drink.'0 Communities along the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers report low fish and
crocodile numbers,'O' and the people living there are concerned about eating fish
due to fears of contamination.0 3 Local indigenous populations have lost tradi-
tional gardens in fertile river soil to flooding, thereby requiring the establishment
of new gardens on higher ground, where rainforest must be cleared and the soil
is less fertile.' 4 River navigation has also become more hazardous due to new
sand banks, increased flow rates, and increased river traffic.'05 These changes
have resulted in reduced self-sufficiency for villagers downstream from the
mine.)° While the cultural impacts of the mine appear to be less extreme further
downstream than they are for the communities near the mine site, the Ok Tedi
mine is not without effect.
D. The Lack of Involvement of Local Landowners in the Negotiation of the
Mining Agreement
The Australian Conservation Foundation reports that, "[tihe absence of
informed community participation in the decision to mine at Ok Tedi and in the
management of the mine, means that this operation has failed to reflect the needs
of the local population."' 7 In the early planning stages of the mine, while able to
obtain some information via contacts with anthropologists and company per-
sonnel, villages received little from the government. t8 This may have been in part
98. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 20.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See RosEnBAUm& KROCKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 9. Residents along the rivers have expressed
concern about drinking the water because they believe it is contaminated. Id.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id. at 10.
104. Id. at 9.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at iii.
108. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 89.
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because plans changed rapidly, but it was primarily because the provincial and
subprovincial governments did not relay information to the villages prior to the
first provincial government election in 1980.'09
Australian National University researcher Marjorie Sullivan reported that:
Before the mine started everybody knew that fish would be killed, that
crocodiles would be killed, that sediments would change streams, that
banks and beds would change .... If you were a villager downstream
you wouldn't really understand what was involved and it is quite likely
that people still don't really understand why some of these changes are
occurring.
So, although it was stated fairly clearly, there was a communications
problem, which will most likely continue. The people who are most
affected are the local people, who are generally the least educated and the
least able to understand the environmental predictions. They only really
understand it when it has happened, so only then do they feel cheated.110
It would not be fair, however, to say that the local populations were not
informed about the mine at all, or that they were not consulted in any way. At
least one member of the Ok Tedi Management Committee travelled to villages in
the vicinity of the mine site and asked questions such as whether the villages
wanted the mine to be developed, whether young men from the villages would
want to work at the mine, and whether the villagers thought they would be able
to start businesses that would supply the mine. 1' When he visited one village, he
discovered that most of the villagers were at Tabubil, where government em-
ployees from Port Moresby were going to explain what was going to happen at
Ok Tedi.112 More recently, both the PNG government and OTML have published
pamphlets explaining the effects of the Ok Tedi Mine on the Ok Tedi/Fly River
system and on the local communities in simple language.
113
Nevertheless, being asked whether they wanted the mine and being informed
about the progress of the mine is not the same as playing an active role in the
negotiation process. The government and the mining companies were able to
exclude local communities from the negotiation process because the government
could claim that it was in the best interest of the nation to exercise its powers
109. See id. at 88-89.
110. Davis, supra note 45, at 28.
111. See JACsgONJ, supra note 6, at 23.
112. Id. at33.
113. See, e.g., OKTEDiTEENvRONmENr AND YOu 1994 (Dep't. of Mining, Papua New Guinea) (on
file with author).
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under the Land Act" 4 to prevent traditional landowners from having any
meaningful say about their right to the "use, occupancy, or enjoyment" of the
land.115
The lack of government involvement in providing information to local
indigenous populations appears to be typical in PNG. This often results, as it did
in the Ok Tedi case, in direct discussions between the developer and the local
leaders, 1 6 which may be less regular than informational meetings given by the
government. In addition, greater cultural barriers may lead to more misunder-
standings between developers and local communities than would occur between
the national government and the local communities.
17
E. Local Landowners' Responses to the Ok Tedi Mine
1. Protests and Violence Relating to the Ok Tedi Mine
In early 1981, the Wopkaimin workers at the Ok Tedi Mine went on strike,
forcing OTML to temporarily halt work on the project. 18 The strike was "a social
protest against the loss of semi-skilled jobs,... [and] against the town plan....
which forced their families off the land to make room for whites and other
nationals who were moving in with their families."" 9
In 1984, tribesmen armed with bows and arrows threatened to blockade the
Ok Tedi Mine unless they were paid compensation for damage caused by cyanide
spills in the Fly River. 120 In 1988, there were three strikes at the Ok Tedi mine. 121
In March, local tribesmen armed with bows and arrows forced the mine to shut
down in a protest demanding compensation for a dead colleague and more local
employment.'2 The stoppage, which was caused by blocking the road to the
mine, resulted in lost production worth millions of dollars according to mine
officials.'2 In late September, some 1200 workers walked off the site and rioted,
114. Papua New Guinea's Land Act is one of the pieces of legislation that converted PNG's traditional
landholding system into a Western system of property rights.
115. Working Group Paper: Institutional Structures and Resource Development, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN RESOURCE MANAGENT FOR PAPUA NEW GUINEA: REPORTOFTELAW REFORM COMMISSION RESOURCES
MANAGEMENTWORKSHOP 34,38 (Law Reform Commission Occasional Paper No. 20.1990) [hereinafter Law
Reform Commission].
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id.
118. Hyndman, supra note 48, at 291.
119. Id.
120. Bow and Arrow Threat Over Cyanide Spill in Papua New Guinea, supra note 48.
121. Chris Sherwell, Papua New Guinea Hit by Shutdown of Second Major Mine, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 19,1990, § 1, at4.
122. Papua New Guinea Tribesmen Blockade Gold Mine, THE REuTER BUS. REP., Mar. 1, 1988,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
123. Id.
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forcing the mine to close.' 24 Police used tear gas to disperse strikers trying to
prevent police from removing roadblocks and reopening the airstrip at Tabubil. 2
The strikers were demanding company housing for all, and reclassification of all
jobs.' 26 The September strike followed a twelve day strike in August.127
The 1989 decision of the PNG government to allow continued operation of
the Ok Tedi Mine without the construction of a tailings dam led to a protest by
hundreds of students in Port Moresby.'2
There were two disruptions at the mine in 1990. In January, protesting
landowners caused the Ok Tedi Mine to shut down temporarily by blocking the
road leading to the mine. 29 The purpose of this peaceful protest was to demon-
strate landowner dissatisfaction with the share of royalties being paid to land-
owners, particularly as compensation for use of the road. 3" In May, operations
at the Ok Tedi Mine were halted by a walkout of about 1000 employees who were
demanding promotions and more jobs for local residents. 31
The Premier of the Western/Fly River Province was arrested in June 1992
after being charged in connection with attempts to close the Ok Tedi Mine. 32 The
Premier had been leading a campaign to close the mine in order to force the
national government to renegotiate the environmental and development agree-
ments to provide greater compensation to the province and to local communities
for environmental damage caused by the mine.
In December 1994, villagers blockaded the mine, bringing production to a
halt. 134 The purpose of the blockade, which was held in the wake of an airplane
crash near the mine site, was to protest government inaction regarding the
building of a road to the mine.'
35
124. More Problems at OkTedi, MINING J., Sept. 30, 1988, at 253.
125. Id.
126. Strikers Run Wild at Ok Tedi Copper Mine in PNG, REUTERS FIN. REP., Sept. 22, 1998, available
in LEXIS. News Library, Arcnws File.
127. Chris Sherwell, Papua New Guinea Mine Remains at a Standstill, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 27,
1988, § 1, at42.
128. HOWARD, supra note 70, at 65.
129. Sherwell, supra note 121, at4.
130. Id.
131. PNG Walkout, THINDEPENDrmC, May 9, 1990, at 11.
132. PNG Provincial PMArrested OverMine Protest, REuR LBR. REP., Jun. 14, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Libr., Arcnws File.
133. Id.
134. Villagers Blockade Ok Tedi Mine in Protest at Air-Only Link, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Dec. 21,1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
135. Id.
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2. Lawsuits Filed against BHP and OTML
In 1994, the law firm of Slater and Gordon filed writs in the Supreme Court
of Victoria (Australia) against BHP, the majority shareholder in the mine project,
and OTML, on behalf of villagers near and downstream from the Ok Tedi Mine.
By September, writs had been filed covering 30,000 villagers from 500 clans,
nearly all the villagers on the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers. 136 Damages could amount
to as much as AUS$4 billion. t According to Alex Mann, a clan leader in the Ok
Tedi area, the lawsuit against BHP was filed because "[t]he people are very upset.
They are angry and they want compensation. That's why we, the leaders, are
trying to get this solved without bloodshed. All of us are fearing it might be the
next Bougainville.'
38
Alex Maun and the Marapka Clan, the traditional owners of land along the
Ok Tedi and its floodplains, filed a suit alleging that discharge from the mine has
caused the Ok Tedi and its floodplains to become:
(i) impure, unclean and noxious;
(ii) detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of each of the
Plaintiffs;
(iii) undrinkable, harmful and poisonous to each of the Plaintiffs and
to the birds [sic] animals, fish and plants upon which each of the
Plaintiffs traditionally or otherwise rely to sustain the funda-
mentals of their life, culture and religion or for commercial
fishing purposes.
139
It further alleged that BHP and OTML "intentionally and/or otherwise made the
waters of the Ok Tedi shallower and consequently to run faster thereby making
them dangerous to the Plaintiffs for transport and other purposes,' ' 40 and
"intentionally and/or otherwise made and caused the said Land to flood by reason
of the build up of sediment in the Ok Tedi and/or caused the said Land to become
prone to severe flooding." 141 It alleged that frequent flooding has "obstructed each
of the Plaintiffs' gardening operations on the said Land," has degraded the land,
136. Tony Kaye, BHP Faces 1,000 Ok Tedi Writs, TaH AGE (Melbourne). Sept. 7,1994, at 25.
137. See, e-g., Tony Kaye, Eyes on $4B PNG Claim, TIE AGE (Melbourne), May 7,1994; O'Callaghan,
supra note 46, at 32; Rod Myer, Ok Tedi Battle Builds Behind the Scenes, SUNDAY AGE (Melbourne), June
19, 1994, at 19.
138. See O'Callaghan, supra note 46, at 32. See infra notes 217-220 and accompanying text (referring
to the civil war which has erupted on Bougainville as a result of the mine).
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has caused erosion, has decreased the animals which provided food to the plain-
tiffs to "negligible levels," and has turned inland estuaries into swamps.142
The clan alleged that these changes in the river have prevented them from
using the river in its ordinary state for fishing, drinking, obtaining water for other
domestic purposes such as watering gardens, recreation, irrigating crops, per-
forming customary spiritual ceremonies, hunting crocodile, replenishing top soils,
supplying drinking water for animals, supporting their "social, spiritual and
cultural environment," supplying "the fundamentals of customary life," and
transportation.
143
In another lawsuit, filed by Barry John Shackles and Darn Fish Supplies Pty.
Ltd., a commercial fisherman and a company engaging in commercial fishing
made similar allegations regarding OTML's conduct and its effects on the Ok
Tedi and Fly Rivers.' 4 They alleged that, "[t]he said conduct of the [defendants]
has prevented water in its ordinary state from the Ok Tedi and the Fly River being
used by the Plaintiffs: A. to fish for commercial profits; B. for transport.'9
1 45
BHP and OTML have responded to the allegations of Maun, Shackles, and
the other plaintiffs by claiming that "all rights, entitlements, interests, causes of
action, claims, obligations and liabilities" relating to the plaintiffs' claims are
governed by PNG law, and that BHP and OTML have complied with that law.14
The defendants deny that the plaintiffs have been harmed in any way, and also
state that any loss or damage that may have been caused by the Ok Tedi Mine "is
the necessary and unavoidable consequence of the lawful, reasonable and proper
operation of the mine and the discharge of tailings as duly authorized by and
under the law of PNG. .. ., B-IP and OTML further point out in their
Amended Defence that "OTML has made compensation payments to the plain-
tiffs.., and those plaintiffs accepted the same in discharge and satisfaction of
their respective claims to compensation.... ,,ts
The PNG government has expressed concern about the effect the lawsuits
will have on investor confidence in PNG1 49 It was this concern that pushed then
Prime Minister Wingti to announce plans to compel the lawsuit to be brought in
142. Id. at 9.
143. Id. at 7-8.
144. Shackles Statement of Claim, supra note 1, at 6.
145. Id. at7.
146. Amended Defence (Amended Pursuant to Leave Granted by the Honourable Mr. Justice Byrne on
the 15th Day of March 1995). Alex Maun and Others v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited and
Ok Tedi Mining Limited, No. 6862 of 1994,2 [hereinafter Maun Amended Defence].
147. Id. at6.
148. Id. at 9.
149. Belinda Goldsmith, PNG Law to Head Off Ok Tedi Claim-Wingd, REuTER ASIA-PAc. Bus. REP.,
May 20. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
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PNG and to limit the damages that could be awarded to landowners. 1 50 The PNG
parliament was scheduled to vote on legislation that would have given effect to
an agreement between BIP and the PNG government on September 20, 1995.
The legislation was to provide for compensation of 100 million kina over fifteen
years plus a ten percent share of the mine, but would impose criminal sanctions
on any person involved in a lawsuit against BHP on behalf of the local com-
munities in PNG anywhere in the world. On September 19, 1995, the Supreme
Court of Victoria found BBP in contempt of court for its part in drafting this
legislation. After BHP advised the PNG government that it could no longer
support the legislation, the PNG parliament did not vote on the proposed
legislation. A spokeman for PNG Prime Minister Julious Chan stated that some
form of legislation to introduce compensation arrangements would be considered
by parliament in the near future.15 ' The government's concerns regarding foreign
investment are warranted. Another substantial goldmine at Porgera discharges its
tailings into the Fly River system, and the present plans for a gold mine on the
island of Lihir would involve the dumping of waste into the ocean. 52 Foreign
investors may be hesitant to continue mining at existing sites or to proceed with
negotiations concerning other potential projects should BHP lose a tremendous
amount of money in this lawsuit. This concern is particularly valid for projects
that are anticipated to be only marginally profitable.
Even the villagers filing the suit do not want the mine closed. As Rex Dagi,
one clan leader, said "No, I don't want to see the mine closed, because even if
they closed the mine, I have lost my environment. I want to see that a restoration
program is carried out.., as well as compensation paid to my people for the
damage it's caused."' 53 Pal Gubara, a government-appointed administrator of the
Fly River Provincial government, and Perry Zeipi, Environment Minister, echo
this sentiment: they do not want the mine to close, and they believe that the
financial impact on the operation of whatever remedy is prescribed must be
minimized.154
In addition to causing the PNG government worry about attracting and
keeping foreign investment, the lawsuit has forced the national government to
150. Rowan Callick, PNG Laws to Neutralise $4Bn Claim on Ok Tedi, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REv., May 18,
1994, at 7. While BHP and OTML did not initially challenge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria
to hear these cases (Barry Fitzgerald, BHP to Fight $4 Billion Ok Tedi Claim, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 3 1,
1994, at 37), they are in the process of seeking leave of the Supreme Court of Victoria to amend their Defence
to plead that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the cases. Letter from Craig Phillips, Partner at Arthur
Robinson and Hedderwicks, to Heather G. White (Mar. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
151. See Bill Pheasant, BHP Loses Out to PNG Villagers, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Sept. 20, 1995, at 3;
Michael O'Meara & Paul Syvret, PNG Landowners Warn of Second Bougainville, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REv.,
AUG. 17, 1995, at 15.
152. Davis, supra note 45, at 28.
153. Peter Gregory, Clan Leader Seeking Billions for His People, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 6, 1994,
at 5.
154. Davis, supra note 45, at 28.
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reconsider its environmental policy regarding the Ok Tedi Mine. As one govern-
ment official pointed out, "'The Government can afford the political fallout even
less than it can afford any contribution to a dam [referring to the fact that the
Government, as a thirty percent shareholder in OTML would be required to con-
tribute to build a tailings dam]."'55 In a democratic country like PNG, politicians
feel pressure because many wish to be reelected to office. In PNG, the pressure
on the government is exacerbated by the fact that the island of Bougainville
seceded in 1989 and has been embroiled in a civil war, due in part to environ-
mental damage caused by a copper mine on the island.
1 56
IV. THE OK TEDI AGREEMENT, AND HOW CERTAIN TERMS MIGHT HAVE BEEN
DIFERENT HAD LOCAL INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES BEEN INVOLVED IN ITS
NEGOTIATION
A. Environmental Provisions
In 1981, a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development-sponsored
study of environmental provisions in mining agreements involving developing
countries described the Ok Tedi copper agreement as the only current mineral
development agreement containing an environmental protection clause that
attempted to create a comprehensive enforcement framework. 57 Perhaps it is in
part because this clause was the first of its kind that it has led to such controversy.
1. Environmental Impact Reports
The initial agreement between the PNG government and BHP provided that
BHP would spend no more that K$150,000 on "physical impact studies ... into
the likely effects of the operation of the Project on the environment."' 58 The scope
of the assessment was very broad, 159 and the funding allotted has been described
as "totally inadequate."' 6 One author stated that "[t]he negotiated budget was so
modest that it virtually precluded substantial environmental fieldwork.' ' 61 While
the spending limit was not eliminated by the 1980 Supplemental Agreement
155. Id.
156. See infra notes 214-229 and accompanying text (discussing the Bougainville crisis).
157. STPa r A. ZORN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY MINING AGREEmE S,
UNCTAD/LDC/I5 (1981) at S.
158. Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) ch. no. 363, at cl. 5.1(k) (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Agreement].
159. See Id., Schedule H. At the time of the 1976 Agreement, the scope of the required environmental
impact study was the most comprehensive ever applied to a mining project in a developing country. ZORN,
supra note 157, at 9.
160. Hughes & Sullivan, supra note 48, at 38.
161. PInrz, supra note 79, at 79.
323
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 8
between the parties,162 a more extensive environmental impact assessment was
done following the signing of the agreement, resulting in "the production of a
series of volumes covering aspects of environmental management and recom-
mendations for programmes for future monitoring." 63 It is possible that earlier
environmental studies would have strengthened the government's bargaining
position on environmental issues. This might have dissuaded BHP from
developing the mine, but it also might have resulted instead in a more
environmentally safe mine.
It is also possible that had the local communities ultimately affected by the
Ok Tedi been involved in the negotiation of the initial agreement, BHP would
have been required to spend an adequate amount on environmental impact
studies. This is by no means certain, however. The purpose of the 1976 agreement
was to determine "the commercial viability of the deposits ... as soon as
possible. . .,",t not to develop the mine. As one commentator stated, "[q]uite
legitimately, the mining consortium was reluctant to commit large sums of money
to environmental work until the project proved viable."'
65
2. Exemption from PNG Environmental Law and the Lack of Govern-
mental Supervision over Mining Activities
A second concern that environmental groups have expressed about the 1976
Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements is that the Ok Tedi Mine is exempt
from PNG's environmental law, and that governmental supervision over the per-
formance of the mine is inadequate. Each of the Ok Tedi Agreements provides
that the agreements "have the force of law as if contained in the respective Act,
and shall apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law in force
in PNG."'
1 6
The agreement preceded PNG's environmental legislation, 67 and because
environmental legislation is a national concern rather than a purely local one, it
is unlikely that involving local communities in the negotiation process of the Ok
Tedi Agreement would have resulted in the creation of a national environmental
162. See Mining (Ok Tedi Supplemental Agreement), ch. no. 363A (1980) [hereinafter First
Supplemental Agreement].
163. Hughes & Sullivan, supra note 48, at 38. Another commentator, who worked for the PNG
Department of Minerals and Energy at the time, states that the government undertook extensive (and
expensive) field studies in 1979 and used computer modelling based on the environmental effects of the mine
at Bougainville. Pairz, supra note 79, at 80. These studies "raised substantial questions about the effects of
mine waste dumping in the Ok Ted! River on downstream residents and subsistence life-styles." Id. The
government studies cost four times the amount OTML paid for the original Environmental Impact Study. Id.
at 89.
164. 1976 Agreement, supra note 158, § 1(5).
165. Pmiz, supra note 79. at 79.
166. Maun Amended Defence, supra note 146, at 7.
167. ROSENBAUM & KROCKENBERE, supra note 27, at 13.
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law, rather than specific requirements for the mine. It might, however, have re-
sulted in greater involvement of the national government, or of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), in monitoring the activities of OTML. It might also have
led to the inclusion of a provision in the agreement that would have compelled
OTML to comply with any later-enacted environmental laws. However, it is
possible that OTML would have refused to agree to such a provision since it
would create the risk that subsequently enacted environmental provisions would
make it economically infeasible to operate the mine at Ok Tedi.
One reason that governmental supervision of the Ok Tedi Mine has been
inadequate may be that such a supervisory scheme was under the control of the
Department of Mining and Petroleum (whose function is to promote mining)
instead of the Department of Energy and Conservation until 1991.168 The lack of
governmental resources discussed in Part II, may also have precluded extensive
testing and inspection of the mine and its effects on the Ok Tedi/Fly River
system.
The Sixth Supplemental Agreement (1986) to the 1976 Agreement required
OTML to conduct an environmental study of the mine's current and predicted
impacts. 169 That study set acceptable particulate levels that must be met by
OTML.
170
OTML is required to monitor the Ok Tedi/Fly River for pollution; if levels
rise too high, the government will consider requiring a tailings dam on the Ok
Mani.171 However, the Australian Conservation Foundation has concluded that in
spite of the millions of dollars OTML spends each year in environmental
research, serious deficiencies exist in its monitoring program,172 and a serious
problem is created by the fact that OTML performs all environmental tests with-
out scrutiny from the PNG government or NGOs. t7 While the PNG government
proposed establishing an independent environmental monitoring agency, OTML
rejected the proposal, and apparently the government dropped the issue'
Involving local communities in the negotiation of the initial and supplemental
mining agreements-assuming that locals were advised by environmental and
legal experts-would likely have resulted in an agreement under which a portion
of the royalties and tax income received by the PNG government from the mine
would have been used to perform environmental studies on the Ok Tedi and Fly
Rivers. Preserving these rivers in their fiatural states would have been more
important to the local people, who rely on them for food, water, and trans-
168. Id.; Environment and Conservation Policy-Ministerial Statement, Draft Handard (PNG) (10102),
Apr. 28, 1993, at 1I (Statement of Party Zeipi, Minister for Environment and Conservation).
169. ROSENBAUM & KROCKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 13.
170. See id.
171. O'Callaghan, supra note 46, at43.
172. RosENBAt3m&KRocKENBERGM, supra note 27, at 12.
173. Id. at 15.
174. PINT., supra note 79, at 90.
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portation, than it would be to government ministers in Port Moresby. In addition,
local communities would have given the national government additional clout in
pressing for an independent monitoring agency. The fact that the Memorandum
of Agreement Relating to the Development of the Porgera Gold Mine Project
(Porgera Agreement),' 75 the negotiation of which included local landowners
contains a provision requiring the national government to (1) "station environ-
mental control and montitoring officers in Porgera"; (2) respond to landowner
concerns regarding environmental issues; and, (3) report the results of environ-
mental studies to the provincial government176 indicates that local involvement
might increase the likelihood of this type of provision in an agreement.
3. Permission to Operate Without a Tailings Dam
The 1980 Supplemental Agreement called for a tailings dam,' 77 and BHP
began construction of one in 1983.178 In 1984, however, the incompleted dam was
destroyed by an earthquake, in part because, as OTML's General Manager stated,
"no intensive geological tests were carried out before the work got underway."
1 79
Therefore, the government approved the temporary operation of the mine without
a tailings dam with some restrictions' 80 in an "Interim Tailings Scheme."181 The
Fifth Supplemental Agreement, entered into in August 1985,182 included a
Permanent Tailings License in Clause 5," which provides for penalties in the
form of reducing the rate at which OTML may extract minerals from the mine
should a tailings dam not be built on schedule. Nevertheless, the Sixth Supple-
mental Agreement permitted OTML to operate without a tailings dam until 1990,
and in 1988 the government abandoned the ITS and allowed OTML to discharge
all tailings into the river system."es
It is probable that, had local communities been involved in the negotiation of
the mining agreement, the deposit of tailings into the Ok Tedi/Fly River System
would have been regulated, either by a tailings dam, or by restricting the rate at
which the mountain was mined. The latter option would have had the added
175. Independent State of Papua New Guinea and Porgera Landowners, Memorandum of Agreement
Relating to the Development of the Porgera Gold Mine Project, May 1989 [hereinafter Porgera Agreement).
176. Id. at 12.
177. Clause 9.1 of the 1980 Suppmental Agreement reads: "The Company shall make provision to the
reasonable satisfaction of the State for the maintenance of the tailings dam after the mine is closed." 1980
Supplemental Agreement, at cl. 9.1.
178. ROSENBAUM & KRocKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 6.
179. Id. (quoting Irwin Newman).
180. See Hughes & Sullivan, supra note 48, at 39.
181. Id.
182. Mining (OkTedi Fifth Supplemental Agreement), ch. no. 363E (1986).
183. Id. at cl. 5.
184. Hughes & Sullivan, supra note 48, at 39. One newspaper reports that the govemment formally
approved continued operations without a tailings dam in 1989. Davis, supra note 45, at 28.
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benefit to local communities of extending the life of the mine (and therefore the
employment of local OTML employees and the life of businesses dependent on
the mine). The reasons it is likely that regulation of tailings would have been
stronger had local landowners been involved in the negotiation of the agreement
are similar to the reasons independent environmental monitoring would have been
more likely to be included.8 5
B. Compensation Provisions
1. Unequal Distribution of Financial Benefits from the Mine
A major issue that arose during the negotiation of the Ok Tedi Agreement
was which landowners would receive compensation under the agreement. Even
among the villagers that received compensation, the amounts varied under the
compensation schedule. 186 Additionally, only villagers whose land was used fQr
the mine itself (as opposed to the power plant or infrastructure projects such as
the road to the mine) received royalty payments.18 7 Further, many villagers
downstream who were negatively affected by the mine were not scheduled to
receive payments at all.
A second inequality in the distribution of benefits from the mine is that
employment and local business development preferences were given only to
people from the Kiunga and Telfomin subprovinces of the Western/Fly River
Province, rather than to all residents of the province. 88
As will be discussed in Part VII.A, whether the distribution of benefits from
the mine would have been more equal had local communities been involved in the
negotiation of the agreement would depend on which local landowners were
involved. It is likely, however, that there would be some disparity in the com-
pensation received by landowners based on the disruption that they experienced.
Additionally, it is likely that if landowners had been allowed to participate in the
negotiation of the agreement at all, downstream landowners, as well as those near
185. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text (explaining why local community involvement
in the negotiation of the agreement would have increased governmental monitoring over OTML's activities).
186. The Ok Tedi Compensation Information Paper of August 1981 provided that the following fees
would be paid to landowners: an occupation fee; payment for restricted access; payment for cleared land;.
payment for physically-used land; and a payment to a trust fund. PrNrz, supra note 79, at 163 (citing Ok Tedi
Compensation Information Paper of August 1981). Thus, compensation would vary depending on the manner
in which a village's land was used by the mine. Id.
187. PiNrZ, supra note 79, at 164. The villagers who own the land at the mine site receive 30% of the
1.25% royalty payments given to the provincial government. ROSENBAUM & ROCKENBERGER, supra note 27,
at 18.
188. See 1976 Agreement, supra note 158, at cl. 30.6 (describing preference for landowners in, and other
people originating from, the Kiunga and Telefomin sub-provinces); Id. at cI. 32.3 (identifying preference for
business development for landlowners in, and other people originating from, the Kiunga and Telefomin sub-
provinces).
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the mine, would have been included in the negotiation, and therefore, they would
have received compensation from the start. It is these very landowners whom
OTML and the PNG government intended to benefit in later years through
finance projects in communities along the river system,'89 such as the Lower Ok
TediIFly River Development Trust 9° and a Special Support Grant beginning in
1991 to the Western/Fly River Province Government to finance projects to benefit
communities along the river system.
2. Inadequacy of Compensation
Critics of the Ok Tedi Agreement, including local landowners, describe the
compensation given to local landowners as inadequate. 9' This issue has been the
root of many of the disturbances at the Ok Tedi Mine discussed in Part III.E. It
is likely that local participation in the negotiation of the Ok Tedi Agreement
would have resulted in greater direct compensation to local communities, as well
as greater indirect compensation through, for example, employment opportunities.
It is also probable that the community would have negotiated for an ownership
interest in the mine. For example, in the Porgera Agreement between local
landowners and the PNG government, a five percent interest was given to local
landowners.' 92 Had this approach been used at Ok Tedi, it would have had the
added advantage of giving local landowners a say in the operation of the mine.
V. EMERGING NORMS OFINTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS TO CONTROL THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY LIvE
Numerous commentators argue that an international law giving indigenous
peoples the right to control the environments in which they live exists or is
emerging. 93 One commentator states that, "[s]ince 1989, a consensus has
189. ROsENBAUM & KROCKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 19.
190. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text (describing generally the benefits the mine has
created to the local inhabitants).
191. See, e.g., Hyndaman, supra note 48, at 291. The total amount of compensation received by each
individual living near the Ok Tedi Mine ranges from K$1,812.00 to K$2,702.00. Maun Amended Defence
supra note 146, at 9.
192. See the Porgera Agreement, supra note 175, at cl. 6.1 (providing that landowners will have the
option to acquire up to fifty percent of the national government's ten percent interest in the mine-five percent
of the total). Ultimately, a 4.9% interest was given to local landowners, and a 5.1% stake to the Enga Provincial
Government. Id.
193. See, e.g., Russell L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of
International Law?, 7 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 33 (1994) [hereinafter Barsh, Indigenous]; Russell L. Barsh, The
Challenge ofIndigeneous Self.Determination, 26 U.MtcH.J.L. REF. 227 (1993) [hereinafter Barsh, Challenge];
Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity: Emerging Recognition of Local
Community Rights in Ecosystems Under International Environmental Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 735 (1992);
ROSENBAUM & KROCKENBERGER, supra note 27, at 21-27.
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developed that indigenous peoples have distinct collective rights, such as rights
to land and natural resources, cultural integrity, environmental security, and cont-
rol over their own development."' 1 4 This argument is based on documents such
as 1LO Convention 169;195 and documents from the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro (Rio Summit) such as Agenda 21,196 the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. 97 It is also based on the actions of members of the international com-
munity such as the proclamation of 1992 as "International Year of the World's
Indigenous Populations."'198 None of these agreements has reached the status of
customary law,'9 which would make them binding on nonsignatories, but
commentators advocating an international law giving environmental control to
indigenous peoples rely on them nonetheless.
1LO Convention 169, which recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to
self-development, cultural integrity, territory, and environmental security, ° has
been ratified by only five states.2° Since neither Australia nor PNG is a signatory
to this document, they are not bound by it. Nonetheless, commentators advocating
the existence of an international law protecting indigenous people argue that the
tenets promoted in the ILO Convention "attained a global consensus at the 1992
Rio summit."m If this contention is accurate, this would mean that nonsignatory
countries such as PNG and Australia would be bound by the tenets of the ILO
Convention as a matter of customary law.
The issue of customary law was addressed by Judge Vincent Broderick of the
Southern District of New York in a case filed against Texaco by indigenous
peoples affected by petroleum drilling in the Ecuadorian rain forest.03 Judge
Broderick explained that "[t]he law of nations is... customary in nature, to be
defined by the usages, solemn commitments and clearly articulated principles of
194. Barsh, Indigenous, supra note 193 at 43-44.
195. Convention Concerning Indigeneous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, I.L.O. Conv.,
I.L.O. 76th Sess., repinted in 28 LL.M. 1382 (1989).
196. Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26lRev/l(Vol.1)(1993).
197. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Annex 1. U.N. Doc. A'JCONF/151/26fRev.1 (Vol.1) (1993).
198. Barsh, Indigenous, supra note 193, at 48.
199. See Memorandum at 16, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter
Memorandum] (stating that no single document can create international customary law, but the unanimity of
view as well as consistency with domestic law and its objectives are highly relevant).
200. Barsh, Indigenous, supra note 193, at 44.
201. Id. at 45; the five states ratifying the ILO Convention 169 are Norway, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
Rica, and Mexico.
202. Id. Justice Broderick of the Southern District of New York stated in the Aguinda case that "[t]he
Rio Declaration may be declaratory of what it treated as pre-existing principles." Memorandum, supra note
199, at 16.
203. See infra notes 238-241 and accompanying text (discussing the lawsuits filed against Texaco).
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the international community.' '204 Judge Broderick focused on international pro-
nouncements such as the Rio Declaration that are "persuasive but not directly
binding,"' 05 on the participation of the United States in the formulation of the
practice which is claimed to be customary,2 and on whether the claimed custom
is consistent with U.S. domestic law.m
Participants at the Rio Summit focused on indigenous populations as an
important source of valuable information about the environments in which they
live; this focus is present also in the documents that were drafted at the Rio
Summit. For example, Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration provides that:
Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities
have a vital role in environmental management and development because
of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and
duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective
participation in the achievement of sustainable development?' 8
Agenda 21 calls on governments to act to:
respect, record, protect and" promote the wider application of the
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local com-
munities embodying traditional lifestyles for the conservation of bio-
logical diversity and the sustainable use of biological resources ....?9
The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations [the working
group], on the other hand, focused on the rights of indigenous groups themselves,
rather than the benefits they can provide to the world as a whole. When they met
in 1993, the working group developed the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, which provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.2t
204. Memorandum, supra note 199, at 15.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 16.
208. Rio Declaration, supra note 197, at Principle 22, p.7 .
209. Agenda 21, supra note 196 at ch. 15, 115.5(e) at 212.
210. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
U.N. ESCOR, Conm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 14, at 4, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26 (1993).
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The working group also focused on the distinctive relationship that indigenous
groups have with the environment of the territories they have traditionally used. 21,
The draft declaration is still under review in the United Nations and does not
have the status of law. Nevertheless, commentators such as Barsh and Brecken-
ridge argue that it demonstrates an emerging customary international law that
respects the rights of indigenous peoples.
The fact that indigenous groups participated directly in the Rio Summit,
12
and soon thereafter in the creation of a Latin American regional development
fund that would be managed by indigenous groups as well as national govern-
ments,13 indicates that indigenous groups are gaining increased international
credibility. The fact that 1992 was designated the International Year of the
World's Indigenous Populations, it is indicative of the modem trend towards
recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples. It seems unlikely, however, that one
could convincingly make the argument that the participation of indigenous popu-
lations in international negotiations that affect them has reached a status of
customary law, or that the naming of a year for their cause has much effect.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss and evaluate the merits
of these arguments, the question arises whether it is possible to extend a right of
indigenous populations to control their environments (if, indeed, such a right
exists) to include a right to participate in the negotiation of a natural resource
exploitation agreement that will have a profound effect on that environment. The
argument could be made that international law is evolving in this direction.
VI. PRACTICAL REASONS FOR INVOLVING LOCAL COMMUNrrms IN THE
NEGOTIATION OF MINING AGREEMENTS
A. The Risk of Violence Causing the Mine to Close
The gravest risk that a mining company and the government face if local
landowners are dissatisfied with the benefits they receive from a mine relative to
the costs associated with that mine is the risk that the landowners will engage in
acts of violence against the mine and its employees. This can result in the
temporary-or even permanent-closing down of a mine, and in a severe case
can even result in civil war.
The most extreme example of this in PNG is the Panguna Mine, owned by
CRA, on Bougainville Island. That mine was approved "with no regard for its
impact on the environment, especially on aquatic life, '214 and the mine has caused
211. Breckenridge, supra note 193, at 757.
212. Barsh, Challenge, supra note 193, at 278.
213. Id.
214. Hughes & Sullivan, supra note 48, at 38.
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serious environmental damage to the Jaba River and surrounding streams? 5
Compensation in the form of cash payments to local landowners amounted to a
few cents per day for each individual.216 In May 1975, prior to PNG's indepen-
dence, workers at the Bougainville mine went on strike and destroyed heavy
machinery and buildings at the mine, resulting in one million kina in damage and
lost production at the mine. More seriously, in 1989, violence on the island
caused CRA to shut down the Panguna Mine.217 This violence ultimately resulted
in a bloody and expensive civil war. Estimates of lives lost in the war reach as
high as 5000,2's and the mine has remained closed for more than five years.219
Landowners have said that the environmental damage caused by the mine and the
lack of compensation paid to them are two of the roots of the violence on
Bougainville.22
While the sense of being exploited by CRA certainly contributed to the
violence on Bougainville, there were other causes as well. In particular, the
people of Bougainville have long desired increased autonomy from PNG. For
example, in September 1975, two weeks before PNG gained independence,
Bougainville seceded from PNG, though it resumed its relationship with the rest
of the country in exchange for the establishment of provincial governments. 21
Today's BRA leadership "still dreams of independence." 22
Whatever the causes of the violence on Bougainville, the civil war has had
a devastating effect on the people of the island, and on PNG in general. Not only
have many lives been lost, but on Bougainville, there are no longer any schools,
hospitals, or medical services available.3 The closure of the mine resulted in a
215. See, eg., JACKSON, supra note 6, at 130; Hyndman, supra note 48, at 294 ("mhe Jaba has risen
30 meters, and the entire valley is under 60 meters of sediment. All aquatic life has been killed, and remobill-
zation of heavy metals ensures that ecocide will continue long after the mining is completed."). Id.
216. Hyndman, supra note 48, at 294.
217. See Australian Mine Staff Wounded by PNG Rebels, Tim AGE (Melbourne), July 15, 1989, at 1
(reporting that two Australian employees of CRA were shot at the mine in July, 1989). Such incidents are
threatening to mining companies and to developing country governments because even if their mines remain
open, qualified employees are discouraged from working at the mines, and foreign investors' perceptions of
a country may be tainted.
218. See Paul Rodgers, Rebels Draw Hard Line in Native Soil; Angered by the Ravages of Past
Exploitation of Unspoiled Lands, the Indigenous Population is Standing Up to the Invaders Who Have Designs
on Their Timber, Minerals or Oil--and Winning, TI malmrT, Sept. 25, 1994, at 9 (reporting that in six
years, 5000 people, mostly civilians, died, primarily due to lack of medication). See also, Klinga Seneviratne,
Bumpy Road to Peace in Bougainville, INTra PRESS SEvicE, Oct. 12, 1994, available in LFXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (noting that Amnesty International reports that PNG troops executed at least 60 people
in Bougainville between 1991 and 1992).
219. See Cameron Forbes, Difficult Times Require Stability and Leadership, THME AUSTRALIAN, Sept.
16, 1994, at 9 (reporting that the leader of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) stated that the mine
could be reopened on the right terms).
220. O'Callaghan, supra note 46, at 32.
221. See, JACKSON, supra note 6, at 75.
222. See Forbes, supra note 219, at 9.
223. O'Callaghan, supra note 46, at32.
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ten percent drop in gross domestic product and a thirty-six percent drop in export
earnings for PNG.' 4 As a result, the cost of military action on the island and of
restoring infrastructure has been extremely expensive for the national govern-
ment."
Less extreme examples of violence are prevalent in PNG. Attacks on power
cables and petty sabotage are common at mine sites in PNG.?2 As was discussed
in Part IMhE, there have been blockades of roads surrounding the Ok Tedi Mine,
and even riots in Tabubil on one occasion. At the Mt. Kare Mine, there has been
repeated violence that created a "state of near war" between local landowners and
CRA.W Ultimately, CRA sold much of its fifty-one percent stake in the mine to
other mining consortia.
While the involvement of local indigenous communities in the negotiation of
mining agreements may not entirely eliminate the risk of violence,m the fact that
this involvement increases the likelihood that landowners will be satisfied with
the agreement correspondingly reduces such risk of violence.
B. The Threat of a Lawsuit
The risk of a lawsuit against a mining company can also be reduced by
involving local communities in the negotiation of a mining agreement. This is
important to corporations investing in mining projects because, even if the cor-
poration ultimately prevails in a lawsuit, it will spend a tremendous amount of
money defending itself. For example, since May 1994, BHP and OTML have
filed numerous motions while defending themselves in the lawsuits about the Ok
Tedi Mine,m certainly incurring very high legal fees. Aside from any legal fees
224. Enrica Longo. Stability Will Get Investors Back, Says Namaliu, Tim AG (Melbourne), Aug. 31,
1991, at2O.
225. O'Callaghan, supra note 46, at 32.
226. John Whyliff, Violence Threatens Over the Unequal Spread of Wealth, BUS. TIMS, Jun. 5, 1993,
at 17.
227. Paul Robinson, Gold Venture Goes Horribly Wrong, SuNDAYAGE (Melbourne), Oct. 11, 1992. An
attack at the mine in January 1992 caused K.$3.5 million in damage and closure costs, and shut the mine down
for eight months. CRA Pulls Out ofMt. Kare, MINING J., Apr. 9, 1993, at 253.
228. Simon Walker, Papua New Guinea, MQING ANNUAL REV., July 1993, at 144.
229. See Whycliff, supra note 226, at 17 (noting that there have been some problems even at the Porgera
Mine, for which the agreement was negotiated with landowner involvement); see Walker, supra note 228, at
144 (stating that at least some of the violence at MtL Kare was caused by conflicts between landowners
competing for an interest in the mine); See also, infra notes 259-269 (discussing the disputes about which
landowners should benefit).
230. The defendants have made the following motions: to set aside judgment in default; to strike out the
proceedings as an abuse of process; to strike out the representative part ofthe proceedings on the grounds that
the consents given by the represented parties were technically deficient; to strike out the statement of claim as
a defective pleading; to strike out the statement of claim on the basis that it is not properly particularized; to
seek a security for costs from plaintiffs; to seek that plaintiffs' counsel be punished for contempt; to seek an
injunction restraining plaintiffs' counsel from making any public comment on the litigation; and to repeatedly
extend the timetable for discovery. Slater & Gordon, Who Is Funding the Ok Tedi Litigation? (Information
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and any money that a corporation pays in a settlement or in satisfaction of a
judgment, lawsuits may be costly to a corporation since they may turn popular
opinion against the corporation in both its home and host countries. Litigation can
also be costly to the national government involved, in that it may discourage
future foreign investment.
Mining companies other than OTML have suffered from lawsuits brought
against them in PNG. The Mt. Kare Mine suffered from litigation brought by
those landowners near the mine who were not given an equity interest in the com-
pany. 31 The hostility that resulted from the loss of the suit by the plaintiffs led to
the violence at the mine discussed in Part IIf.E.
Even the Porgera Mine, in spite of the involvement of local communities in
the negotiations, has been subject to lawsuits. Property owners in the vicinity of
the mine sued the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) for AUS$33 million as com-
pensation for a sixty liter spiU of hydrochloric acid from a truck? 2 PJV rejected
the claim on the grounds that no harm was done,233 and threatened to sue the clan
leader who filed the suit for reputational damage and loss of business.2- The suit
was dropped, for the clan did not have any evidence to support its assertions. The
suit may have caused-or reflected-some local hostility to the mine. Never-
theless, the fact that the magnitude of the suit (in terms of damages and parties
participating) was smaller may indicate that the conflicts between local com-
munities and the mine owners at Porgera are less severe than at either Ok Tedi or
Mt. Kare.
Lawsuits in other parts of the world also exemplify the threat that such a
lawsuit can pose to a mining company. For example, the pacific island country
of Nauru sued Australia in the International Court of Justice to obtain restitution
for the environmental devastation caused by phosphate mining on the island
under Australia's trusteeship?35 That case differs from the Ok Tedi case and other
cases involving mining companies because it focuses on the duties of Australia
as a trustee responsible for Nauru. ? 6 It is similar to the Ok Tedi case, however,
in that it deals with environmental destruction that took place without the consent
of those who vere most affected by that destruction, and in that it deals with the
rights of indigenous populations to determine their ecological destinies. Nauru
Sheet Created by Slater and Gordon, Counsel for Plaintiffs), 1-2 (1995) (on file with author).
231. Rowan Callick, PNG Backs CRA in the Dispute overMt. Kare, AuSmRALIAN FIN. REv., Nov. 13,
1992, at 22.
232. Maslen, supra note 4, at21.
233. Id Mine Manager Peter Harris stated that the limestone cap on the road immediately neutralized
the acid, and that the company sent a helicopter to cover the area with soda ash in case any acid was not
neutralized. rd.
234. Id
235. See generally, Antony Anghie, "The Heart of My Home": Colonialism, Environmental Damage,
and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'LL. J. 445 (1993).
236. See generally, i!&
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asked for between AUS$72 million and AUS$120 million as compensation; the
suit was settled out of court for AUS$107 million, which Nauru is using to im-
prove the natural environment on the island.?37
More similar to the Ok Tedi suit is a lawsuit filed in 1993 by the Sekoya tribe
in Ecuador against Texaco. The plaintiffs in that suit are asking for US$1.5 billion
in damages, plus an order compelling Texaco to clean up a billion barrels of crude
oil that the company pumped into the Ecuadorian rainforest.238In addition to legal
fees and the risk of having to pay a large sum of money to the Sekoya tribe, this
suit has harmed Texaco because adverse publicity has prompted an international
consumer boycott.239 The suit has also spawned a US$1 billion suit by a Peruvian
tribe alleging that Texaco's operations in Ecuador have also caused damage in
Peru.2 Texaco avoided a lawsuit by the Ecuadorian government by agreeing to
pay to repair the environmental damage, and to build schools and first aid
stations.?
C. The Importance of Maintaining a Good Working Relationship with Local
Residents
Involving local communities in the negotiation of mining agreements will
foster good working relationships with local communities for both the mining
company and the national government. This is because involving locals in the
negotiation will give them a sense that the company and the government are
taking their needs and views into account, will reduce later conflict by satisfying
at least some of these needs, and will improve communications between the
company, the government, and the local communities. The PNG Law Reform
Commission noted that a major factor causing animosity between landowners and
developers is that traditional landowners are regarded as "a party to be informed
later when the damage is done" 242 In a democratic country such as PNG, elected
officials will receive the added benefit of greater popularity with the electorate,
thus increasing their chances for reelection. Such a relationship could avert strikes
and nonviolent protests at mine sites, as well as lawsuits and violence discussed
above. It could also benefit the corporation through positive publicity in both its
237. Michael Field, Nauru Starts Work on Recreating its Garden ofEden, AG cEFRANcEPREsSa, Jul.
21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
238. Robert Nixon, Crude Awakening in Ecuador; Oil Pools Created by Texaco Inc., FARTH ACTION
NETWORKc, August 1994. at 12. For a detailed discussion of Texaco's activities in the Orient, see Judith
Kimerling, The Environmental Audit of Texaco's Amazon Oil Fields: Environmental Justice or Business as
Usual?, 7 HARv. HuM. Ris. J. 199 (1994).
239. See Nixon, supra note 238, at 12.
240. Texaco Rejects Claims in Environmental Lawsuit by Peruvian Indians, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 16, 1995,
at 17.
241. Texaco, EcuadorSettle Clean-Up Spat; CompanytoPayforOrient Work, PLA7'VSOILGRAMNEWs,
Oct. 7, 1994.at 3.
242. Law Reform Commission, supra note 115, at 38.
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host and home countries. For example, extensive public relations efforts 2A3
ensured that even when a deal between the PNG government and Kennecott (the
initial corporation that attempted to develop a mine at Ok Tedi) fell through, the
Min held the company in high regard.' The government was criticized both
domestically and internationally as being "pathologically suspicious' and
unable to work with foreign investors.? 6
D. The Involvement of Local Communities May Result in a More Com-
prehensive Agreement That Will be Renegotiated with Less Frequency
Because a mining agreement that is negotiated with the involvement of the
indigenous communities near the mine is more likely to be complete and to
satisfy the needs of the communities, it may need to be renegotiated less
frequently. This can save both the government and the mining company a tremen-
dous amount of money, and can reduce the uncertainty that surrounds a renego-
tiation. In the nineteen years since the original Ok Tedi Agreement, there have
been six supplemental agreements and countless side agreements; the negotiation
of these was certainly costly. In addition, the government issued a formal notice
requiring OTML to close the mine in 1985 during a renegotiaton 27 such a
shutdown is expensive to the company, and there will always be the risk that the
shutdown will be permanent.
Local involvement will not prevent all renegotiations. Renegotiations of
agreements may occur when the structure of the concerned industry changes, the
position of a particular firm within the industry changes, the political and eco-
nomic situation in the host country changes, or the negotiating and administrative
skills of the parties change.24 8 At Porgera, for example, the PNG government
renegotiated its equity interest from ten to thirty percent in 1992.7A9 Nevertheless,
the number of renegotiations and of issues to be dealt with in those renegotiations
will certainly be reduced.
243. Kennecott's public relations efforts included book prizes at every grade level for sixty high schools
throughout the country; providing half the school fees for six students at each of fifty high schools; carefully
planning trainees' careers; and inviting leading PNG personalities to visit Tabubil. JACKSON, supra note 6, at
50-51. The company also provided health care facilities, recreational facilities, and the first formal educational
facilities for the people of the Star Mountains. Id.
244. Id. at 66.
245. Chris Ashton, How PNG Failed in the Investment Big League, NAT'LTihEs (Australia) (quoted
in JAcKsON, supra note 6, at 66).
246. JAcKsON, supra note 6, at 67.
247. OkTediAccord, MININGiJ., Mar. 7, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
248. DAVID N. SMrI & Louis T. WELLS, NEG01IATIONG THIRD WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTs 6-7
(1975).
249. Mark Baker, PNG Mines Fuel for Conflict. THE AGE (Melbourne), Dec. 24, 1992, at 13.
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VII. MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE INVOLvEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNrmES IN
THE NEGOTIATION OF MINING AGREEMENTS
A. While a Habitat May Recover Entirely One Day, the Damage to
Indigenous Cultures is Irreparable
OTML claims that the height of the Ok Tedi and Fly river beds will return to
their natural states within twenty years after the closure of the Ok Tedi Mine.F0
This means that the river system will be altered for at least fifty years 5 In
addition, the lifestyles of the native landowners near the mine site, and Tabubil,
will experience lifestyle disruptions at least for the life of the mine, which is
estimated to remain in operation until 2008. 2 It is unlikely that after such a
lengthy disruption, indigenous populations will be able to regain their traditional
lifestyles. By 2008, most of those who remember life before Ok Tedi will be
dead, and the new generations will know no other way of life. To take away a
community's culture-especially without its consent-is wrong, particularly
when that culture is not replaced with anything that could be described as
"better."
253
Destroying a culture wrongs not only the population whose culture is
destroyed, but also the world as a whole. The world loses the possibility of seeing
the traditional crafts produced by that culture, and loses the value of knowing that
unaltered societies still exist. These societies may be able to provide to the world
valuable information about how to live in harmony with nature,' and are also an
important source of information about traditional uses of native flora and fauna.
Such information about uses of native plant life may, among other things, reveal
effective medicines for easing pain or treating presently incurable diseases.
B. Even a Democratic Government May Not be Fully Representative of
Local Interests
As a democracy, PNG is dedicated to the ideal of the participation of all its
citizens in the governing process. The first National Goal of PNG is "for every
person to be dynamically involved in the process of freeing himself or herself
250. RosEDUM & KRo ER, supra note 27, at 9.
251. Id.
252. Id. at7.
253. See supra notes 77-106 and accompanying text (disussing the unlikelihood that the life of the Min
and other peoples near the mine will be better after the mine is closed).
254. For a discussion of the valuable information that local communities may provide about
environmental preservation, see Breckenridge, supra note 193, at 744-745, 761, and sources cited therein.
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from every form of dominion or oppression.... ."255 Involving local communities
in the negotiation of mining agreements is an important step towards that goal.
Without local involvement, even the best-intentioned national government
may serve its own interests over those of the local communities most affected by
the development. The Law Reform Commission in PNG has stated that "[natural
resource exploitation] agreements in this country completely miss the point,
because they take place between the government and the developer, who has the
money. The true resource-owner does not participate. So the government
negotiates'the best deal for itself, not for the owner."2'' 6
The disparity of interests that exists between local landowners and the
government can lead to the feeling that the politicians have sold out to foreign
interests. For example, Joseph Sukwianomb, Vice-Chancellor of the University
of Papua New Guinea in Port Moresby has said, "[i]t is the quality of leadership
that is in question. I'm very worried about the situation. We do not appear to have
charge any longer over the direction in which we are moving, over our own
destiny." 7
The national government's interests may diverge from those of the local
community in several ways. First, local communities feel the effect of environ-
mental damage much more severely than the country as a whole. Second, the
national government represents people from all parts of a country. Therefore, it
will be interested in spreading the benefits of a mining project evenly throughout
the population, 8 while the local community will prefer to benefit dispropor-
tionately from the mining project. This local interest is justified to some extent
given the increased costs experienced by the communities near a mine. Finally,
the government may be interested in maximizing its own income (via taxes and
equity interests) from a mining project, rather than maximizing the overall profits
from the mine, or minimizing the damage caused. While the mining company can
negotiate provisions that align the government's interest in maximizing revenue
with achieving the highest profit possible (for example, taxing only profits on the
mine, or giving the government an equity interest in the mine as was done at Ok
Tedi and Porgera), local communities often do not have the opportunity to
negotiate to protect their interests in the project. The fact that local landowners
received an equity interest in the Porgera project (a portion of the share given to
the national government) indicates that the involvement of local communities in
255. The National Goals and Directive Principles as They Relate to Resources and Environment Law:
Creating the Intermediate Legal Norms, in LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 115, at 5 [hereinafter
National Goals and Directives].
256. Working Group Paper: Economics, Environment and the Interface with the World, LAW REFORM
COMMISSION, supra note 115, at 56.
257. Maslen, supra note 4, at 21.
258. See National Goals and Directives, supra note 255. at 6 (stating that "[the second National Goal
is "for all citizens to have an equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the development of our
country.").
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the negotiation of mining agreements does, in fact, alter the balance of benefits
received from the project vis-d-vis the landowners and the national government.
VIII. DIFFICULTIES CREATED BY INVOLVING LOCAL COMMUNmES IN
NEGOTIATIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As will be discussed below, there are several problems created by involving
local communities in the negotiation of mining agreements: it will often be diffi-
cult to determine which communities should be involved in a negotiation; in-
volving more parties in a negotiation makes the process more complex and costly;
local communities may not have enough information to make rational decisions
during a negotiation; and there may be disagreements between the national
government and local communities about the provisions that a mining agreement
should include.
Most of these problems could be avoided by merely holding public meetings
and consulting with community members rather than actually negotiating with
them. This author does not believe, however, that public meetings would be
effective in solving the problems discussed in Part VI. While these meetings
would give local communities the opportunity to explain their concerns to their
national government and to the project developer, it is unlikely that the needs of
the communities would be accurately reflected in an agreement simply because
public meetings had taken place. This is because both the national government
and the project developer have interests that are counter to those of the local
community.
A. It May Be Difficult to Determine Which Local Communities Should be
Involved in the Negotiation Process
1. The Problem
One problem that mining companies and the national government will face
when involving local communities in the negotiation of mining agreements is that
it may often be difficult to determine which local groups should be included. This
is certainly true in PNG, where there are so many different cultural groups whose
interests and needs may conflict with each other. The fact that land may have
several "owners" who use the land for various purposes, and the fact that the
establishment of a mine encourages the growth of squatter communities, make the
task of determining which groups should participate in a negotiation all the more
difficult. 9
259. See Rodgers, supra note 218, at 9.
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During the Ok Tedi negotiations, for example, local people were defined for
some purposes as those who received royalty and lease payments from the mine.
For other purposes, they included those in the Kiunga and Telefomin subpro-
vinces. The latter group was to receive preference in business development and
employment, while the former received direct cash distributions from the mine.
Clearly, the direct cash payments were more valuable, especially since the lack
of educational facilities in the Kiunga and Telefomin subprovinces makes it
unlikely that many local landowners would have the necessary skills to work for
OTML. 210 At Ok Tedi, the definition of local communities was ultimately
extended so that all clans affected by the changes in the Ok Tedi/Fly River system
received some compensation from OTML, though the amount of this com-
pensation still varies dramatically between those receiving royalty and lease pay-
ments, and those who are merely beneficiaries of the Lower Ok TediIFly River
Development Trust.
At Ok Tedi, there has also been dispute about which tribal groups actually
owned the land that was leased for the mine and the accompanying infrastructure.
The Faiwolmin were expected to be essentially unaffected by the Ok Tedi Mine,
yet, because their leader was interested in promoting their development, he
argued that the Wopkaimin stole the land at the mine site from the Faiwolmin less
than a century ago, and that therefore the Faiwolmin should be receiving com-
pensation from OTML.6' While this claim is discredited by those who have
studied land ownership patterns in the area, it has received much attention in the
PNG press.22
Similarly, once the development at Ok Tedi became publicly known, a
tremendous number of people claimed Min ancestry. One commentator stated
that, "the Star Mountains, far from what has long been thought, are being trans-
formed from a present day, almost uninhabited wasteland into one of the most
densely settled areas of the country in recent historic times-if all such claims are
to be believed."2 63
The problem of which clans can participate in the negotiation of a mining
project, and hence benefit most directly, has caused serious problems at Mt. Kare.
During the negotiations for the Mt. Kare project, CRA went to great lengths to
identify 6000 legitimate landowners.? 4 These landowners became owners of
forty-nine percent of the equity in the mine.2 In 1992, however, another group
of landowners (funded by two Australian mining consortia) challenged the right
260. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 164.
261. Id. at 165-166.
262. Id. at 166.
263. Id. at 165.
264. Rodgers, supra note 218, at 9. CRA performed four major studies of the genaology and land
boundaries of the area around the mine. Ian Howarth, Mr. Kare Landowners Threaten More Violence,
AUsP AUANFIN. REv., Sept. 23, 1992, at 21.
265. Howarth, supra note 264, at 21.
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of the participating landowners to the benefits of the mine. While their legal
challenge was unsuccessful, opposing landowners ultimately contributed to
CRA's shutting down of the mine.2 7 Production at the mine was temporarily
halted in January 1992 after an attack by armed militants threatened more
violence if ownership issues were not quickly resolved"6 A statement of the
Directors of Kare-Puga Development Corp., the holding company for the
landowners, said that the "[1l]andowners are annoyed that CRA has still not
resolved genealogy, [and] land boundary survey... [issues]." 269
2. A Potential Solution: Have Independent Anthropologists and
Environmentalists Perform Extensive Studies
It is important that governments and mining companies involve anthro-
pologists and environmentalists early in the project consideration process. For
example, a study of the social and economic impact of a gold mine on Lihir was
undertaken at "an earlier state in the development of mining operations than have
previous studies of this type in Papua New Guinea." 270 While it is too early in the
negotiation process to determine the value of this study to participants in the
negotiation process and to local communities in particular, many benefits to such
an early study exist, at least in theory. Specialists can be valuable in determining
which communities will potentially be affected by environmental and social
problems created by a mine, and can ascertain which should be involved in the
negotiation process.
Anthropologists and environmentalists who are paid by the national
government or by the company developing a mine may have incentives to provide
information that is favorable to the party paying them. In addition, parties to a
negotiation may employ experts whose philosophies they believe complement
their negotiating positions. Therefore, while it is likely that these experts will
have to be paid by the mining company or the government, NGOs should also be
permitted to evaluate the project. This openness would allow difference of
opinion, and might provide valuable information for various groups to use later
266. Rowan Callick, PNG Backs CRA in the Dispute over Mt. Kare, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Nov. 13,
1992, at22.
267. Note that there were other problems at the mine leading to violence. Specifically, the joint venture
that held the local landowners' interest in the mine filed for bankiptcy, and some landowners alleged that they
had been manipulated into signing an agreement with CRA. There were also allegations that CRA had been
involved in shootings, gas attacks, and village burnings. Paul Robinson, PNG Warns 'Rip-off' Miners, SUNDAY
AGE (Melbourne), Oct. 11, 1992, at 1.
268. Howarth, supra note 264, at 21.
269. Id.
270. See generally, COLINFLER&RICHARDJACKSON, THESOCIALANDECONOMICIMPACTOFA GOLD
MoE ON Lmm (1988). While preparing a study at an earlier stage makes it more difficult to predict the effects
of the mine on local communities due to the uncertainty about the mining techniques that will be used, it also
can provide information that will be valuable during the negotiation process, Id. at 10.
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on in the negotiation process. There would be a risk that NGOs would be driven
by their own political interests to develop information that would be contrary to
the interests of the parties involved in the development of the mine. This risk,
however, would be minimal in this context since the reports of one NGO would
be countered by reports by others, since any questionable scientific techniques
used could be critiqued, and since the purpose of the information provided by the
NGOs would be merely to inform the government and the corporation about the
potential effects of the project. Problems that NGOs might create through
involvement in the negotiation process itself will be discussed in more detail in
Part VIII.C.2, infra.
B. Involving More Parties in the Negotiation Makes the Process More
Complex, Hence More Costly
1. The Problem
A second problem with involving local communities in the negotiation of
mining agreements is that involving more parties in a negotiation inevitably
makes the negotiation more complex, more time consuming, and more costily.
This is because having more parties involved means that there are more issues
where parties' interests conflict. This is particularly true when dealing with
indigenous groups whose entire value systems are different than those of the cor-
porations with whom they are negotiating. As the PNG Law Reform Commission
put it, "the developer, in most cases a multi-national corporation, does not speak
the same financial and economic language as the village elder."27' For example,
the discussion stage for compensation and relocation agreements at Porgera took
eight months 27
2. Proposed Solutions
The cost of including local communities in the negotiation of mining
agreements could be reduced by having two separate negotiations, rather than one
three-party negotiation. For example, the national government could negotiate
with the local communities and with the corporation separately; or the corporation
could negotiate with the local communities directly without the involvement of
the national government, and then the corporation could negotiate with the
government. This might result in a less costly negotiation process because issues
that were relevant only between two parties would be handled without consuming
the time of the third. In addition, it would allow two parties to come to an agree-
271. Law Reform Commission, supra note 115, at 43.
272. Rowan Callick, Porgera: Big Gold to be Model for Future Resource Projects, AUSTRALIAN FIN.
REV., Sept. 14, 1989, at 12s, 14s.
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ment on their bargaining position, then present that position to the third party.
This would save time in the negotiation.
This author advocates having the government and the local community
negotiate with each other, leaving it to the national government to negotiate with
the mining company, as was done at Porgera. In that instance, the national
government divided its share of the proceeds from the mine between itself and the
local communities near the mine. 3 This solution is preferable to alternative
schemes because, while not identical, the interests of the national government and
the local communities are more closely aligned than either of these parties'
interests is with the investing corporation. Both local communities and the
national government have an interest in keeping as high a proportion of the
financial benefits as possible of the project within the country, and in enhancing
spinoff effects of the project. The foreign corporation, on the other hand, wants
to keep as much of the income from the mine for itself as possible, and might
prefer to purchase supplies from its customary suppliers rather than from local
suppliers. In addition, at least in a democratic country like PNG, the national
government will have an interest in upholding the interests of its local com-
munities during negotiations with the corporation. Finally, having previously
reached at least a-tentative agreement with the local communities affected by the
mine will increase the bargaining power of the national government vis-d-vis the
corporation because of the corporation's need to maintain good relations with
local indigenous groups.
C. Local Communities May Not Have Enough Information to Make a
Rational Decision
1. The Problem
Local communities also may have difficulty participating effectively in the
negotiation process because they: (1) may have inadequate information about the
proposed project; (2) may not fully understand the impact that the project will
have on them; (3) may not have the skills to negotiate effectively; and (4) may not
have the legal and business savvy to fully understand the contract they are
signing. This can result in legal disputes- and bitterness once the mine is oper-
ational and its effects are felt.
For example, there were allegations that CRA deliberately pushed local land-
owners at Mt. Kare to sign an agreement that was not in their best interest. Local
landowners alleged that they had been flown to Cairns, Australia by CRA to sign
the agreement, and that they had been provided with alcohol and prostitutes. 74
273. See Porgera Agreement, supra note 175.
274. Paul Robinson. Trouble in Paradise, SUNDAYAGE (Melbourne), Oct. 11, 1992 at 1.
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Former CRA mining engineer at Mt. Kare, Terry Henningsen, reported that no
legal or business advice was given to the landowners, and that he quickly became
aware that the villagers had "a total lack of comprehension about amounts
literally over 100. 1 was told stories of landowners demanding compensation of
one million and being delighted at receiving 5000 kina in K2, K5 and K1O
bills."275 CRA denied the allegations and pointed out that the KDC (the
corporation established by local landowners to hold and manage their interest in
the mine) directors had signed the resolutions agreeing to later sign a shareholder
agreement in Port Moresby "in an open meeting with witnesses." 276 In any event,
the sentiment among local landowners was that they had not received the money,
schools, roads, and hospitals that they had been promised by CRA. 277 These
allegations highlight the problems that can arise when negotiating with local com-
munities. At Mt. Kare, these problems, like the problem of determining which
landowners should be permitted to participate in the negotiation, contributed to
the violence that ultimately caused CRA to abandon the Mt. Kare Mining Project.
Porgera has also recently experienced some landowner dissatisfaction. In
spite of the fact that the gold mine at Porgera, which opened in 1990, has yielded
gold worth more than AUS$1.4 billion, there is not one company- or
government-employed physician in the entire Enga Province. Schools are poorly
equipped, and the road to the mine is unpaved.2 78 The average lifespan in the
province remains around thirty years, and one third of the children there die
before reaching the age of fiveY 9 Nevertheless, Fritz Robinson of Porgera's com-
munity relations division states that the people living on the land where the mine
was to be established were "very skilled and well-informed negotiators.
2. Proposed Solutions: The Provision of Experts to Advise Local
Communities
Certainly, experts will be needed to advise local communities during the
negotiation process to ensure that the communities are participating in a
meaningful way. These experts could be provided by the mining company and/or
the national government, or could be provided by NGOs.
The provision of experts by the mining company or the environment would
be an added cost to those parties, and might create the risk that advisors provided
to local communities would be biased in favor of the developer or the government




278. Maslen, supra note 4, at 21.
279. Id. at 27.
280. Ron Callick, supra note 272. at 14s.
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salaries, particularly if that party is a repeat player as most large mining com-
panies and governments of resource-rich developing countries surely are.
Allowing NGOs to provide advice to local communities would eliminate the
cost to the government or mining company, and would eliminate the risk that the
experts would be biased in favor of the mining company or the government.
Using NGOs, however, would instead create the risk that some local communities
in poorly publicized cases would not be represented at all, and would also create
the alternative problem that too many NGOs might want to be involved in
particular cases. This could create confusion for members of local communities
as different experts gave them different advice, and could create serious problems
for all the parties involved if there were no screening process to ensure that the
assistance provided was truly expert and was not merely serving the agenda of the
NGO. In addition, even NGOs that have expert qualifications may use the
negotiating position of the local communities to pursue their own agendas rather
than to assist the communities, or may use their position in the negotiation to
undermine government policies or to force the corporation to abandon the project.
For example, when Conoco allowed NGOs to participate in discussions about a
proposed petroleum project in Ecuador, these NGOs actively campaigned against
the project and ultimately caused Conoco to withdraw its proposal.?1 Either of
these possibilities would be unpalatable.
It is, therefore, crucial that NGOs advising local communities in the nego-
tiation be subject to a screening process whereby the national government andfor
the corporation investing in the country could preclude the participation of NGOs
that did not have "expert" qualifications, or were pursuing their own political
agendas to the detriment of the local communities, the government, or the
corporation. The screening process could, however, be used by the national
government or by the corporation to ensure that only sympathetic NGOs were
involved in the process. This could effectively eliminate the assistance that these
experts were intended to give to local communities.
Another possible solution would be to allow any technically qualified NGOs
to participate in the supervision of company- or government-funded advisors to
local communities. This solution would assure local communities of represen-
tation, prohibit the undue influence of the community's negotiating position by
NGOs, and permit organizations with varying perspectives to oversee and
evaluate the work performed by appointed advisors to local communities. In such
a scheme, the NGO advisors would be able to publicly protest poor advice and
represent the communities in court later if the advice given to the local
281. See, e.g., Raymond Colitt, Business and the Environment: Exploiting the Rain Forest-Local
Indians, Oil and Conservationists Have Formed an Uneasy Alliance in Equador, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993,
at 13; Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Driving Out Conoco Disservice to Rain Forests, HousToN CHRONIci, Aug.
26, 1992. at 21.
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communities by the company, or government-funded advisors, was not in their
best interests.
D. Local Communities and the National Government May Disagree
1. The Problem
Another problem with involving local communities in the negotiation of
mining agreements is that the communities and the government may disagree
about provisions of the contract. The government may be more willing to com-
promise environmental preservation for profit, or, conversely, the local com-
munity may be willing to accept large amounts of money in exchange for the
destruction of the environment in which they live. If the national government
were to prevail in such a situation, it would foster resentment by the local com-
munity of both the government and the mining company. This may result in
violence directed against the project, and may also be politically devastating to
the national government, particularly to elected representatives from the area
where the damage occurred. If, on the other hand, the local community were to
prevail, it might be able to benefit to the detriment of the rest of the country.
The most stark example of this problem is the crisis on Bougainville, where
civil war has resulted from the people's demands for: "a better deal for the
landowners affected by the mine (including compensation for environmental
damage); a better deal for Bougainville (that is, the profits from the mine staying
in Bougainville rather than going to the PNG Government); and secession.
2. Potential Solutions
One procedure that may alleviate this problem is having the local com-
munities negotiate only with the national government rather than participating in
a three-way negotiation between the government, the developer, and the
community. This will prevent the developer from pitting the local communities
against the government in its own self-interest, and will also eliminate the need
for representatives of the mining company to waste time participating in disputes
that are not their own. On the other hand, the company will have an interest in
ensuring that the negotiations between the government and the community are
fair since it will suffer the effects of a hostile community if that community feels
that it is not receiving a fair share of the project's benefits. The civil war on
Bougainville is an extreme example of the importance of good community
relations to the corporation; the Ok Tedi lawsuit is another.
282. David Hyndman, Digging the Mines in Melanesia, CUL'IURAL SURVIVAL Q., Vol.15, no. 2 32,35
(1991).
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Realistically, the national government's position will (and should) prevail
over that of the community, though it is imperative that the local community's
position be taken into account for the reasons discussed in Parts V through VII
of this article. One reason for this is that the national government will have an
interest in maintaining positive relations with a local community-particularly
one whose desires are clearly expressed in the negotiating process-whereas a
local community may not have a similar interest in maintaining relations with the
national government. An example of a local community's lack of concern for the
national government is the Bougainville secession. It would be devastating to a
country, and, indeed, to the world as a whole, should outside forces become
involved, since local communities could gain all the benefits of a resource project
and secede. That is not to say, however, that the government should not take the
demands of the local community seriously. It is in the government's interest, as
well as those of the investing company, to do so, since national unity is important
to the national government (particularly when a major source of government
revenue is involved), and since in a democractic country, representatives of the
area where the mine is located presumably desire reelection.
One alternative would be to require an arbitration panel to balance the
national and local interests in a project. This, however, could be very expensive,
and would be threatening to national governments in that it would take away part
of their sovereignty over the natural resources in their territories. It is unlikely that
many national governments would accept such a scheme.
IX. A PROPOSED PROCESS FOR INVOLVING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN THE
NEGOTIATION OF MINING AGREEMENTS
A. The Government and the Mining Company Should Carefully Consider
the Interests and Needs of the Local Community in Making Their Own
Proposals
It is ultimately in the best interests of the government and the mining
company to carefully consider the interests and needs of the affected local
communities in negotiating mining agreements. Regardless of the balance of bar-
gaining power during the negotiation, the acceptance of the agreement by the
local community is vital to the success of the project. Antagonizing the com-
munities near a mine can result in violence directed against the mine and op-
position to the national government. In an extreme case, the result could be civil
war like that on Bougainville.
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B. Communities Should Negotiate Directly with the Government Early in
the Process so the Government Can Take Their Needs into Account in
Negotiating with the Project Developer
It is important that negotiations between the local communities and the
government take place early in the negotiating process rather than after the
government's share of the revenue from the mine has already been determined.
This is because including the local communities' needs in the government's
demands is likely to increase the portion of the project revenues that will go to the
country overall. The negotiations between the national government and the land-
owners near the Porgera Mine appear to have occurred only after the national
government's equity interest in the project (ten percent) had been determined.
3
It is possible that PNG could have received a greater interest in the mine had the
interests of the local community been taken into account prior to the negotiation
with the mining corporation. From the corporation's perspective, it is important
to have the needs of the local community clearly set out prior to negotiations
between the developer and the national government. Conceivably this will reduce
the likelihood of later renegotiations or the extension of present discussions as
new and important issues, not considered by the developer or the national
government, are brought up by the communities.
C. Experts Should be Involved Early in the Process to Determine Which
Communities Should Participate, to Advise All Parties to the
Negotiation, and to Ensure that Local Communities are Adequately
Represented in the Negotiation Process
Experts must be involved throughout the negotiation process if local
communities are to be effectively included. Early in the national government's
and the developer's contemplation of a development, economic and social impact
studies should be done by independent anthropologists and environmentalists.
This will make it easier to determine which local communities will be affected by
the mine (more importantly, which local communities should be involved in the
negotiation). This will also improve the quality of the negotiations between the
national government and the developer, since all parties will be operating with
more complete facts.
Legal and technical experts should also be involved in advising local
indigenous communities that participate in the negotiation process, whether that
negotiation is with the government, with the developer, or both. These experts
should be approved by both the government and the corporation, regardless of
who pays for them since local communities' negotiating stance will be affected
283. See Porgera Agreement, supra note 175, at 6-8.
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by their advice. If they are biased, they could potentially sway the negotiation in
favor of one of the other parties. In addition, NGOs that have legal or technical
expertise should be permitted to oversee and evaluate the work of the experts and
to make the results of their evaluations public or use them as evidence in court if
there is any indication of bias. This will act as an additional safeguard to protect
local communities from being manipulated by either the investing corporation or
their national government. Nonetheless, the NGOs will be in a role where they
can do only limited damage if they follow their own organizational agendas rather
than working in the interests of the indigenous populations affected by the mining
project.
X. CONCLUSION
In this article, the author has described the problems that have resulted at the
Ok Tedi Mine in PNG, including the environmental and cultural damage that has
resulted from the Mine. This article has also focused on the responses of the local
communities to this damage; in particular, the lawsuit filed by local communities
near the Ok Tedi Mine against its developers. By evaluating the Ok Tedi Agree-
ment and how some of its terms might have been different had local communities
been involved in its negotiation, it has been shown that at least some of the
problems created by the Agreement could have been avoided by local community
participation. The fact that so many problems have arisen at Ok Tedi for the
nearby communities, for OTMIJB-P, and for the PNG government demonstrates
why it is crucial that local communities be involved in the negotiation of mining
agreements.
While involving local communities in the negotiation creates additional
difficulties for the national government and for the transnational corporation
developing the project, the author has presented the case that these problems can
be avoided, at least to some extent, and, in any event, that they are far less
significant than the problems created by not involving communities in the
negotiation process.
Thus, local communities should be involved in the negotiation of mining
agreements through the process described in Part IX above. All parties should
consider the needs of local communities in developing their own negotiating
positions, the indigenous groups should negotiate directly with their national
government early in the process, and experts should be involved throughout the
process, both to counsel the communities, and to advise the national government
and the investing corporation.
Involving indigenous groups in this manner will reduce the likelihood of
violence at a mine site, will improve relations of the national government and the
mining company with local communities, will reduce the threat of lawsuit, and
will reduce the necessity for repeated renegotiations of a mining agreement. In
addition, involving local communities in the negotiation is important because
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even a democratic government may not truly represent the needs and desires of
a local community affected by a mining project, and because the possibly un-
necessary destruction of a community's culture is devastating to that community
and may also be harmful to the world as a whole. While there are difficulties in
involving local communities in these negotiations, if managed correctly, the
benefits will outweigh the costs.
BIIP has been damaged reputationally and financially by the Ok Tedi Mine
lawsuit. The PNG government is seen by many as unrepresentative of the
interests of communities within the country such as those affected by the Ok Tedi
Mine and by other mining projects such as that at Porgera. At least some of the
problems that have resulted along the Fly River could have been averted by
involving communities along the Ok Tedi/Fly River system in the negotiation of
the initial Ok Tedi Agreement. While it may be too late for BHP and the PNG
government in this instance, it is not too late for these repeat players-and others
like them-to act differently on future projects. The PNG government is trying
to change based on the hard lessons it has learned at Bougainville. However, the
admittedly less serious problems encountered at Porgera and Ok Tedi indicate
that there is still much room for improvement.
